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TAKING VERSUS REASONABLE REGULATION: A
REAPPRAISAL IN LIGHT OF REGIONAL PLANNING
AND WETLANDS
DENis BINvER*
We have treated our land as if it were a limitless resource. Traditionally, Americans have felt what they do with their own land is
their own business. This attitude has been a natural outgrowth of the
pioneer spirit. Today, we are coming to realize that our land is finite,
while our population is growing. The uses to which our generation puts
the land can either expand or severely limit the choices our children
will have. The time has come when we must accept the idea that none
of us has a right to abuse the land, and that on the contrary society as
a whole has a legitimate interest in proper land use. There is a national
interest in effective land use planning across the nation.
-President Richard M. Nixon
Council on Environmental Quality,
First Annual Report xii-xiii (1970)
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA

When a governmental body "takes" private property for public use, it is
exercising the power of eminent domain. The owner of the property must be
compensated. When a governmental body regulates the use of private property,
it is exercising its police power' and regardless of the hardship borne by the
owner,2 compensation need not be paid. Courts frequently distinguish these
two powers in the following way: 3

A.B. 1967, J.D. 1970, University of San Francisco; LL.M. 1971, S.J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan; Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University.
1. There is no commonly accepted definition of "police power." But it is traditionally
"employed to protect the health, safety, and morals of the community in the form of
such things as fire regulations ... garbage disposal control . . . restrictions on prostitution
• .. and liquor." Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964). However, the
police power is not limited to these areas and has in fact been expanded throughout the
years.

2.

Hadachek v. Sebastian, 299 U.S. 394, 410 (1915); Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195

Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925).
3. Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 11
Cal. App. 3d 557, 572, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897, 906 (ist Dist. 1970).
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Under the power of eminent domain property cannot be taken for
public use without just compensation. However, under the police power,
property is not taken for use by the public; its use by private persons
is regulated or prohibited where necessary for the public welfare.
The difference between the two powers may seem clear on paper, but in
practice drawing a line between them defies the wisdom of a Solomon. Courts
and commentators have been unsuccessful in drawing the line between taking
and reasonable regulation because of the inconsistency among prior cases and
the lack of criteria for rationally deciding future cases. The unsatisfactory
resolution of this problem has been more important in individual cases than
in the over-all scheme of land use and planning. Today, however, with
mounting public, political, and scientific concern over the environment,
courts will be squarely confronted with delimiting the state's power to regulate the use of private property in the interests of man's survival.
State regulation of land use must accelerate to offset the imbalance caused
by a rapidly increasing population encroaching upon a constant land mass.
This regulation may be accomplished through comprehensive plans for
regional and state development, like our present comprehensive zoning plans
for municipalities. The property owner who objects to such restrictions may
then challenge them by alleging an unreasonable, excessive, and arbitrary
4
exercise of the police power resulting in a taking.
The Status of the Law Today
The fifth amendment provides: "No person shall ... be deprived of ...
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation." These protections have been made
applicable to the states by incorporation into the fourteenth amendment.5
In addition, every state, either in its own constitution, statutes, or through
judicial decisions, has recognized similar rights in private property. 6 Interpretation of the due process clause in this area can only be described as a
smorgasboard. Even the Supreme Court has admitted that "[tjhere is no set
formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins."7 This disorder has mainly resulted from the Supreme Court's failure to adopt a
definitive test; instead the Court's decisions have been inconsistent and
frequently contradictory. Each case has seemingly resulted in a new rule,
which is abandoned in the succeeding case. Commentators have tried, but
failed to find an underlying rationale to these decisions. s

4. For example, Connecticut has recently denied a permit to a developer to fill 227 acres
of tidal wetlands in Stratford. He is now suing the state for $77 million. Letter from Peter
H. Borgemister, Executive Secretary of Save the Wetlands Committee, Inc., to Denis Binder,
March 25, 1971.
5. Chicago, B & Q R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
6. 2 L. ORGEI, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN §I (2d ed. 1953).
7. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
8. See notes 59-68 infra and accompanying text.
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During the first century of this country's existence it was possible for
the courts to adopt a highly simplistic test of a taking. If the state entered
and physically possessed the property, there was a taking. 9 Conversely, without
physical possession, there was no taking. The theory is still good today as
far as it goes.1 0 Unfortunately, the test failed once government started extensively exercising its regulatory powers over economic activity and private
property. The economy, public needs, and regulations became too complex for such a rigid formula.
The other test, which sprang into judicial vogue, was the "noxious use"
test.11 This test was an outgrowth of the laws of nuisance and allowed cities
to prohibit the operation of a fertilizer plant, 12 livery stable,'13 brick yard, or
clay kiln. The prohibited activity may have been a lawful business enterprise, but as expressed by Mr. Justice Sutherland in one case: "A nuisance
may be merely a right thing in the wrong place -like a pig in the parlor
instead of the barnyard."'i9
The noxious use test was expanded to cover situations not ordinarily
considered nuisances. The railroad grade cases are a primary example. 6
Railroads had constructed their rights-of-way before automobiles existed and
their tracks later became obstacles to auto traffic. The Supreme Court held
that the states could require the railroads to pay the costs of constructing
17
grade crossings to permit the free flow of traffic.
Even the taking and noxious use tests did not cover all situations where
regulation should dearly be permissible. Consequently, other approaches were
used by the courts.
Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon' advanced a new test and has received the distinction of being cited in most of the subsequent decisions involving taking versus reasonable regulation. That case questioned the constitutionality of a state law that prohibited the mining of anthracite coal in
such a way as to cause the subsidence of homes. The owners of the surface
rights had previously conveyed their rights in the coal fields to subjacent

9. United States v. Cross, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi
Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871); Smith v. Corporation of Washington, 61 U.S.
(20 How.) 135 (1857); Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418 (1823).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950); United
States v: Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); cf. YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969); United
States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958); United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1945).
11. Sax, supra note 1, at 39.
12. The Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Village of Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878).
13. Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
14. West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881, appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 658 (1937).
15. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
16. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n., 346 U.S. 346 (1953); Erie R.R.
v. Board of Pub. Util. Conlf'rs, 254 U.S. 394 (1921); Chicago, B. & 0. Ry. v. Illinois, 200
U.S. 561 (1906); cf. Nashville, C. 8= St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935).
17. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. City of Minneapolis, 232 U.S. 430, 438 (1914).

18. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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support. The effect of the statute was to make many seams of coal unrecoverable. Justice Holmes emphasized the extent of the loss that would
19
result to the mineral owners- a diminution of value test:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every small
change in the general law. As long recognized some values are enjoyed
under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power. But
obviously the implied limitation must have its limits or the contracts
in due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a
certain magnitude in most if not all cases there must be an exercise of
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.
20
Added costs imposed on an owner are not enough to invalidate a measure,'
since all restrictions have some effect on costs or result in some diminution
in value. Courts have ruled that individual hardship, no matter how severe,
will not necessarily invalidate a restriction,2 1 and occasionally total bans on
the practical use of property have been upheld .2
The Court, however, and even Mr. Justice Holmes, frequently failed

to follow the diminution of value test. 23 Indeed, in one of the few cases

decided by the Court in the past decade, Goldblatt v. Hempstead,'24 the Court
stated: "Although a comparison of values before and after is relevant . . .it
is by no means conclusive ....,,2r,
The case involved a town ordinance pro-

hibiting any excavation below the water table. The effect was to shut down
a sand and gravel quarry that had been operating continuously since 1927.
The value of the mineral rights, but not of the land, was reduced to nothing.
Safety considerations justified the ordinance, since there were 2,200 homes
and four schools within a radius of 3,500 feet of the pit, and a 20-acre lake
with an average depth of 25 feet had already been created by the mining.
The Court upheld the municipality's actions on the narrow basis that the
landowner had not carried his burden of proving that the ordinance was
unconstitutional.

26

The facts of the case left undecided the question of what action the
Court would take if confronted with a total loss in value of the property.
Although the answer to this question is clear in areas such as the regulation

19. Id. at 413.
20. Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Il1. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956); Maryland Coal
& Realty Co. v. Bureau of Mines, 69 A.2d 471, 475 (Md. 1949); Dufour v. Maize, 358 Pa.
390, 56 A.2d 675 (1948).
21, See cases cited note 2 supra.
22. An example is the possession of deleterious food. See note 27 infra and accompanying text; cf. The Shorehaven Golf Club, Inc. v. Water Resources Comm'n, 146 Conn. 619,
625, 153 A.2d 444, 447 (1959).
23. Sax, supra note 1,at 41-42, 44-45.
24. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
25. Id. at 594.
26. Id. at 594-96.
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of food and drugs, 27 it is far from clear when the regulation affects real
property. 28 The Court refused to face this issue when shortly after the Goldblatt decision it dismissed an appeal 29 challenging regulations that prohibited
the operation of a rock, sand, and gravel pit in the San Fernando Valley for
"want of a substantial federal question."30 The lower court found there was
"no appreciable economic value"31 for any purpose other than quarrying. The
California supreme court, however, upheld the ordinance on the grounds that
it was part of a comprehensive zoning plan, to which courts will always show
great deference. 32
Despite these occasional deviations the strength of the diminution of value
test should not be underestimated. It plays a large role in state court decisions. Regulations are frequently invalidated for resulting in too much
diminution of value.3 3 An inequity results from this approach when substantial restrictions are placed on the use of land, but the owner must continue to pay property taxes.34 The most frequently cited case on this point is
9
Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher"
where the plaintiff's property was
zoned exclusively for residential development. The plaintiff was able to show
that the land had no practical value for residential use, and the New York
Court of Appeals agreed. It stated:38
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property
that it cannot be used for any reasonable purposes goes, it is plain, beyond regulation, and must be recognized as a taking of the property.
The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and
actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve
him of that burden.

27.

North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908). The costs of

the manufacturer under this approach can be high. Recently, Abbott Laboratories had to
recall its intravenous solution products because of contamination resulting from an unsafe
design of the bottle stopper. Abbott expects to lose nearly $5.5 million, or 39 cents a share,
because of the recall. The figure includes recall costs, inventory destruction, and current
restrictions on production and sale. It does not include, however, any expenses arising out
of lawsuits brought by survivors of deceased patients, Wall Street J. April 22, 1971, at 3,
col. 2 (Midwest ed.).
28. See notes 89-128 infra and accompanying text.
29. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 371 U.S. 36 (1962).
80. Id.
81. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 519, 370 P.2d
342, 344, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, 640 (1962) (quoting trial court).
32. Id. at 520-22, 370 P.2d at 345-47, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 641-43; see Miller v. Board of
Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P.381 (1925). The court further rejected the diminuition in
value test.
33. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
834. Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 1 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1941); MacGibbon v. Board of
Appeals, 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v.
Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 282 (1963).
35. 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
36. Id. at 232, 15 N.E.2d at 592 (emphasis added).
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In this case 4,456 dollars was paid in property taxes between 1928 and 1936
on the lot being litigated.
Another approach, often used by the courts to uphold a measure, is based
on the burden of proof. The party attacking the constitutionality of the
measure has the burden of showing its unconstitutionality. 37 A court may
uphold a measure if the plaintiff fails to carry this burden 38 as the Court did
in Goldblatt.39 In this situation courts will not, at least openly, inquire into
the reasonableness of the legislative judgment unless it is arbitrary, wanton,
1
or grossly unreasonably.40 A typical statement is:4
The City . . . is the sole judge as to what is best for the public
health and safety of its inhabitants . . . If there is a relationship

between the ordinance and its purpose, then unless its determination of
the best method is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to be the equivalent
to fraud it will not be set aside.
A frequent corollary used by the courts is to determine if there is a rational
basis for the state's action and, if so, whether the means employed are reasonably related to the objective sought. 42 If so, the court will not interfere with

the legislative determination. Consequently, if the avowed legislative purpose
behind the act is the protection of the public health, safety, or morality, and
there is a rational basis for the means employed, the courts might uphold the
43
measure as a reasonable regulation rather than a taking.
On the other hand, courts have looked behind the legislative purpose to
invalidate restrictions on the use of land, considering the legislative judgment
to be but a "guise." 44 The terms "arbitrary," "capricious," and "grossly unreasonable," which are frequently employed in these cases, are highly conclusionary and serve no useful purpose in explaining the decision. There are

37. Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 II. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
38. Id. See also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
39. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
40. Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Miller v. Board of Pub.
Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925). Thus, if the court finds that a statute is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary, it is a valid exercise of the police power. See, e.g., Village
of Spillertown v. Prewitt, 21 Ill. 2d 228, 171 N.E.2d 582 (1961).
41. Barber's Super Markets, Inc. v. Grants, 80 N.M. 533, 535, 458 P.2d 785, 787 (1969).
The case involved a town ordinance prohibiting private burning except as per regulations,
but the right to collect, reuse, and dispose of garbage was granted to a private company
whose approval was also needed for the issuance of any regulations by the town for private
burning. Plaintiff operated a supermarket. His application for a permit to install an incinerator was denied.
42. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Beverly Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
40 Cal. 2d 552, 254 P.2d 865 (1953); Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 571-72, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897, 905-06 (1st Dist.
1970); Farmington River Co. v. Town Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 25 Conn. Supp. 125, 197
A.2d 653 (Super. Ct. 1963).
43. See, e.g., Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Sax, 328 U.S. 80 (1946).
44. See, e.g., Northern Ill. Coal Co. v. Medill, 397 I1. 98, 72 N.E.2d 844 (1947). See also
Merced Dredging Co. v. Merced County, 67 F. Supp.598 (S.D. Cal. 1946).
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no standards for defining what is reasonable or unreasonable, capricious
or deliberate, or arbitrary or rational. The terms are merely useful catchwords.
The degree to which a court will question the legislative judgment often
depends upon the subject matter. When a question of public health, safety,
or morality is involved courts take a liberal position on the amount of permissible state regulation. Deleterious food can be banned entirely, thereby
rendering it worthless. 4 Similarly, DDT may be banned, 46 fire hazards can
be destroyed without compensation, 47 and breweries can be closed s If a
state must decide between preserving valuable apple orchards or aesthetically
pleasing, but commercially worthless red cedar trees, it can order the destruction of the latter without compensation. 49 Contamination of the public drinking water can be prohibited before the fact and severely punished after the
fact. 0
Similarly, courts are permissive of a state's efforts to conserve its natural
resources, 5 such as fish and game.52 Indeed, state power to restrict hunting and
fishing by a person on his own property 3 has been upheld and production of
oil and gas has been severely restricted ("prorated") to prevent waste.54
There is one final layer to this smorgasboard, so far only property rights
have been discussed but if there is no property right involved there is no
need to resolve the problem. Thus, by holding that no property right is involved the entire problem disappears by definition. The Supreme Court has
in fact engaged in this semantical juggling of property rights with navigable

45.

See note 27 supra.

46. Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
47. See cases cited note 80 infra.
48. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
49. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). What if the Court should adopt the same
result today when courts are no longer taking such a cavalier approach to aesthetics? See
notes 109-118 infra and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Chidsey v. Black, 363 Pa. 231, 69 A.2d 376 (1949).
The Supreme Court has stated that under the police powers a "state may order the
destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise endangering the lives of passers-by; the
demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle;
the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food." Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894).
51. This principle is so well established that some courts no longer deem it necessary
to cite authority to this effect. Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist.,
3 Cal. 2d 489, 529, 45 P.2d 972 (1935). "That the protection and conservation of the
natural resources of the state is in the general welfare and serves a public purpose, and
so constitutes a reasonable exercise of the police power, is now so well settled that no
further citation of authority is necessary." Id. at 988.
52. Leer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
See also McCready v. Virginia, 95 U.S. 391 (1876).
53. People v. Bridges, 142 Ill. 30, 131 N.E. 115 (1892); Windsor v. State, 103 Md. 611,
64 A. 288 (1906); State v. McKinnon, 153 Me. 14, 133 A.2d 885 (1957).
54. Champlain Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 233 (1932). The state further has
the power to set prices for the gas at the wellhead. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil
& Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 185-86 (1950).
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waters.95 In United States v. Willow River Power Co.56 the Government
raised the water level of the St. Croix River, impairing the efficiency of a
private hydroelectric plant. No lands were flooded nor was any injury done to
the company. Loss of power was the only basis for the lower court judgment
57
in favor of the company. The Supreme Court reversed, stating:
Rights, property or otherwise, which are absolute against all the
world are certainly rare, and water rights are not among them. Whatever rights may be as between equals such as riparian owners, they
are not the measure of riparian rights on a navigable stream relative
to the function of the Government, in improving navigation. Where
these interests conflict they are not to be reconciled as between equals,
but the private interest must give way to a superior right, or perhaps
it would be more accurate to say that as against the Government such
private interest is not a right at all.
Thus, courts may choose from a moving kaleidoscope of legal theories. While
such an approach is standard procedure for the French Court of Cassation,58
it is alien to our judicial system, which expects predictatibilty and consistency
from our courts. With the judiciary at an impasse in this area it might be
hoped that commentators could decide upon a proper test to be applied in
these cases. Theories have been forthcoming, but the problem is as unresolved
as ever.
Professor Dunham has advanced an eradication of evils approach:59
The prohibition or regulation must compel an owner to eliminate
a public evil created by him and cannot compel him to act only to
promote the public interest by providing without cost something the
public wants. 0
Thus, a property owner can be compelled to bear the external costs of his
activities, such as water pollution from a factory, rather than passing the
costs onto society as a whole. His test is, of course, very similar to the noxious
use test.
Professor Sax has divided the state's interests into entrepreneurial and
mediatory roles. 6A In the former the government is seeking to enhance its
own interests and compensation must be paid. In the latter the government

55. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 43 (1913); United
States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
56. 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
57. Id. at 510.
58. J. DAwsON, THE ORACLES OF Tim LAW 409 (1968).
59. Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 650,
664-66 (1958); Dunham, Griggs v. Alleghany County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme
Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 63.
60. Dunham, Griggs v. Alleghany County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court

Expropriation Law, 1962
61.

SuPREmE CT.

REv. 63, at 75.

Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss1/1
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is trying to resolve problems between two classes of citizens, such as landlords and tenants, labor and management, or the apple growers versus the
cedar owners in Miller v. Schoene.62 No compensation is necessary if the state
63
is acting in a mediatory role.

Professor Michaelman advocates a fairness test: 64 "Is it fair to effectuate
this social measure without granting this claim to compensation for private
loss inflicted thereby?"68 Other commentators advance a balancing test. 66
"Weighing of the public benefit against the burden cast upon the private
property should be the controlling consideration in determining whether
there has been an exercise of eminent domain or of police power." 67 One
commentator recognizes that there is frequently an interplay between regulation and compensation and that the means used should be the most appro6
priate under the circumstances.
For all of their different approaches, the various notes, comments, and
articles share two characteristics in common. First, they frequently criticize
the approach adopted by others. Second, none have been followed by the
courts. It is not the purpose of this article to criticize these past writings.
However, realizing the judicial ineffectiveness of past efforts, the author will
attempt to advance a test that may prove useful in analyzing future problems
and hopefully will receive a better fate at the hands of the judiciary. Frequent
reference will be made to cases and writings in an effort to cull the best from
the past.
THE PROPOSED TEST: BALANCING

In reviewing the cases and literature, one test stands out as the proposed
standard. This is the balancing approach. Statements such as: "The application of the ordinance to the plaintiff's land would seem to be so harsh in
comparison with the trivial public benefit, if any, which might result from
the enforcement, that the ordinance is confiscatory when applied to the
plaintiff's land '69 often appear in the cases.70 This primitive balancing test,
either stated in an opinion or considered only in the court's deliberations,

62. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
63. Sax, supranote 61, at 63.
64. Michaelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
65. Id. at 1172.
66. Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain -Policy and Concept, 42 CALu. L. REV. 596
(1954); Comment, Distinguishing Eminent Domain from Police Power and Tort, 38 Wash.

L. Rev. 607 (1963).
67. Comment, supra note 66, at 613.
68. Netherton, Implementation of Land Use Policy: Police Power v. Eminent Domain, 3
LAND & WAiTR L. R.v. 33, 51-57 (1968).

69. Horwitz v. Town of Waterford, 151 Conn. 320, 324, 197 A.2d 636, 638 (1964).
70. Cf. West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881 (1937).
One court stated: "It may be said in a given case that due process permits regulation to
such extent as is necessary to protect the essential public interest involved." Merced
Dredging Co. v. Merced County, 67 F. Supp. 598, 609 (S.D. Cal. 1946).
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frequently appears to be the critical factor in the adjudication of a taking
or a reasonable regulation.
Balancing tests have previously been advanced by commentators,7 1 but like
other proposed tests they have not been adopted by courts. According to such
tests a taking occurs when there is an infringement upon private property so
substantial as to outweigh the public benefit. - One commentator believes
that the principal concern of the courts is to draw a line equitably between
compensability and non-compensability, and in reaching a fair result
courts must carefully weigh and balance the conflicting interests. 3
The main problem with the balancing tests previously proposed is that,
aside from a simple statement of the principals to be considered in balancing,
no attempt is made to weigh and analyze the varying factors.7 4 Certain considerations are obviously more important than others and should bear more
weight. The various elements to be considered are not new and have appeared
in numerous cases and articles.
The most important factor to be considered for the property owner is
the degree to which the use of his property is restricted. If the state has
actually entered upon the property, it is clear that a taking has occurred.
In the past courts have invariably held that such an action constituted a
taking, and there is no reason why courts should hold differently in future
cases. Ownership of private property is cherished as one of our most valuable
rights. Although regulation of property is frequently necessary 1 and no
right, not even free speech, is absolute 7 6 physical seizure of private propertyintentionally or through negligent trespass - is contrary to our national fiber.-7
Such a taking may occur constructively through an application of Professor
Sax's entrepreneurial test. In this situation the state does not actually take
the fee interest in the property but forces the owner to perform a state func-

71. See note 66 supra.
72. Comment, supra note 66, at 613.
73. Kratovil & Harrison, supra note 66, at 626.
74. One commentator lists the following factors to be considered: purpose of the act,
degree of deference given to the legislature, finding of facts by the legislative committee,
physical intrusion, use prevented, alternative uses, permanence of the intrusion and its
effect on the public, and the number of others subject to regulation. Comment, supra note
66, at 616-17. Another commentator would consider the degree of injury, social utility, and
economic and policy considerations. Kratovil & Harrison, supra note 66, at 626-27.
75. Powell, The Relationship Between Property Rights and Civil Rights, 15 HASINGS
L.J. 135 (1963). Professor Powell lists 20 areas of state regulation of land use, including:
easements by necessity, nuisance law, diversion of water benefits, sanitation and sewage
regulations, building codes, maintenance of morality, soil conservation, timber control,
zoning, blight prevention, housing adequacy, and protection of parties short in bargaining
power. Id. at 149. His list might also include: dedication, see notes 324-31 infra and accompanying text; fair housing, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); flood
plains regulation, see notes 280-294 infra and accompanying text; and wetlands preservation, see notes 230-271 infra and accompanying text.
76. The laws of libel, invasion of privacy, obscenity, and sedition are examples of limits
on free speech.
77. An exception to this rule is the seizure and destruction of contraband. See, e.g.,
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
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tion, such as the operation of a school or park. Such a restriction may allow
several "uses" but the only practical one is the performance of the state
function.
An offsetting factor would permit the owner to charge a reasonable tuition
or admission fee that would allow him to recoup his investment and earn a
profit. If an economic return is practicable under the circumstances, then
there is not as strong a mandate to compel a finding of taking. Although
the owner would be prevented from using the property for whatever he desires he would still be making a fair return on his investment. However, requiring him to perform a state function without a reasonable expected return
78
should dearly constitute a taking.
The imposition of a total ban would probably result in a taking.79 Courts
are loathe to uphold total restrictions on the use of property, but will do so
if there are strong reasons such as the protection of the public health and
safety. A good example arises when a city orders the razing of an old, wooden
81
building as a firetrap so or the banning of unwholesome food.
The difficult cases are those in which the ban is less than total but still
results in substantial restriction on the use of property, especially when there
is a substantial diminuition in value. The more adversely effected an owner's
property, the more compelling should be the public necessity required as a
counterbalance. Conversely, the lesser the restraint the less compelling the
reasons would have to be.
One question of great importance in cases involving a total ban, or large
diminuition of value, is whether there is a less restrictive, reasonable alternative
that would accomplish the same result. Instead of tearing down a fire trap,
it might be possible for the owner to renovate the building and remove the
82
objectionable features at a reasonable cost.
An objection to the reasonable alternative approach is that it might
result in the courts, actually or apparently, second guessing the legislature
as to the necessity for a particular measure. Statements such as: "It is for
the legislature to decide what measures are needed to reduce fire hazards
to the minimum 8s 3 are quite common. This approach affords the courts a
78. The state's motives are sometimes suspect where the state wants to acquire a
piece of property in the future and takes action to force the price down through a rezoning of the property with such restrictions as to depress its value on the open market.
Courts have reacted strongly against this practice in the past. Kissinger v. City of Los
Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 827 P.2d 10 (2d Dist. 1958); Sanderson v. Willmar, 162 N.W.2d
494 (Minn. 1968); City of Plainfield v. Borough of Middlesex, 69 N.J. Super. 186, 173 A.2d
785 (1961); Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 868 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 84 (1951). There is no strong
reason that would compel a different result today.
79. see notes 286-310 infra and accompanying text. See also Carter v. Town of Palm
Beach, 287 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1970) (invalidated a ban against the operation of any surfboards
in the town).
80. City of Houston v. Schluster, 840 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1960); Houston v.
Lurie, 224 S.W.2d 871 ('ex. 1949).
81. See note 27 supra.
82. Id.
88. Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 828 U.S. 80, 83 (1946).
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way of avoiding tough decisions, especially in cases involving public health
and safety. In addition, it serves to insulate them against criticism from the
8
legislature. 4
However, certain considerations should offset this judicial reluctance.
These cases involve total bans or severe diminuition in value of private property. When other uses are available for the property the courts should continue their present attitude; the owner still has reasonable options and values
open to him. However, when the owner is totally or severely restrained in the
use of his property, he should be entitled to an independent determination
of the necessity for these restrictions, for he is the one who must bear the costs,
not society. Furthermore, courts frequently look to the reasonableness of the
ban, including the possibility of reasonable alternatives. 5 An honest expression of this inquiry would help avoid the criticism and cynicism created
by the present situation.
On the other side of the scale, several factors must be considered. The
first inquiry should be to determine the nature of the interest the state is
trying to protect. The strength to be accorded a factor in the balancing test
should vary in relation to its public importance. For example, the protection of the public drinking water supply or prevention of an epidemic should
receive more weight than aesthetic considerations. Thus, regulations involving
the public health and safety should bear great weight in the balancing test.
The protection of a state's water supply clearly falls into this highly protected class, and courts will go to great lengths to protect it. The restriction
of shellfish harvesting to certain locations or seasons because of contaminadon is another example.86 Other measures that should fall into this classification include the implementation of flood plain zoning and the imposition of
strict standards for fire prevention in buildings.
A similar, but somewhat weaker consideration, is the protection of state
natural resources such as fish, game, and minerals. The Supreme Court has
granted states great leeway in this respect 87 and the states have taken full
84. The reason for this reluctance is historical. Until the middle of the New Deal Era
the courts, with the United States Supreme Court leading the way, invalidated social and
economic measures as violations of the fourteenth amendment due process clause. The
courts subsequently came under a vicious attack with President Franklin Roosevelt's "court
packing scheme" a manifestation. The Supreme Court retreated and state courts have
generally followed its lead. Fearful of another public attack, courts frequently defer to
the legislature determinations of what is necessary to protect the public interest. For a full
discussion of the economic due process conflict see McCloskey, Economic Due Process and
the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34. See also Paulsen,
The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REV. 91 (1950).
85. Horwitz v. Town of Waterford, 151 Conn. 320, 197 A.2d 636 (1964). See generally
Kratovil & Harrison, supra note 66, at 609-10.
86. In Massachusetts 25% of the shellfish producing areas have been dosed because
of pollution. In the Merrimack River area, Quincy Bay, and Beverly-Salem Harbor over
58,000 bushels of clams valued at $500,000 could not be utilized because of domestic sewage

pollution.

W. JEROME, JR.,

A.

CHESMORE &

C.

ANDERSON,

JR.,

87.
(1894).
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(1968).
Wells v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133

SOURCES OF THE PARKER RIVER-PLUM ISLAND SOUND ESTUARY

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss1/1

15

12

Binder: Taking Versus Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal in Light of Re

19721

REGIONAL PLANNING AND WETLANDS

advantage. Hunting and fishing are restricted.8 8 Timber cutting is controlled. 9 Water can be kept in a state.90 Oil and gas well production can be
severely restricted at the wellhead.91
One issue as yet unresolved is the extent to which land can be considered
a natural resource of the state. Is the preservation of open space and the
protection of our ecologically valuable wetlands from destruction a permissible legislative objective? The weight to be given these objectives in our
balancing test depends upon their importance, which is only now beginning
to be appreciated.92 We have reached that point of our national development,
when land, no matter what its present use, is becoming an increasingly
valuable resource of the state. The population is increasing rapidly,93 creating
inexorable pressures on land values. The good lands are already in productive
use.9' Open space is becoming scarce and more desirous of saving.95 No
longer can man continue to treat land in a cavalier manner. It is no longer
free for the asking or settlement.9 1

88. State v. McKinnon, 153 Me. 15, 133 A.2d 885 (1957). In upholding the constitutionality of state statutes concerning hunting and fishing the Supreme Court has recognized the
need of the state to preserve its food supply. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896);
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 139 (1894).
89. State v. Dexter, 32 Wash. 2d 551, 202 P.2d 906 (1949). In re Opinion of the
Justices, 103 Me. 506, 69 A. 627 (1908). In this case the court stated: "There are two reasons
of great weight for applying this strict construction of the constitutional provision to
property in land: (1) Such property is not the result of productive labor, but is derived
solely from the State itself, the original owner; (2) the amount of land being incapable
of increase, if the owners of large tracts can waste them at a will without State restriction,
the State and its people may be helplessly impoverished and one great purpose of government defeated." Id. at 511, 69 A. at 629.
90. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
91. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.

92. See notes 132-232 infra and accompanying text.
93. The Bureau of the Census estimates that the 1965 population of 195 million in
this country will double by 2010. U.S. DErP' or Tmx INTERIOR, THE POPULATION CHALLENGE:
WHAT IT MEANS TO AMEucA 9-10 (1966).

94. The federal government still owns 725 million acres of the more than 2 billion
acres in the United States. But as a general rule most of these lands have the least economic
potential. U.S. PUBLIC LAND LAW REvEvw CoMMISSION, ONE Tnm oF nm NATION'S LAND 28
(1970). Thus, the more productive land of this country is in private hands.
95. See note 332 infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the problems of
open space see Krasnowiacki & Paul, The Preservation of Open Space in Metropolitan
Areas, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 179 (1961); Note, Techniques for Preserving Open Space, 75

H v. L. RV. 1622 (1962). In the opinion of this writer the best book written on the
subject of open space is W. WHYTE, THE LAST LANDSCAPE

(1968).

96. This country originally was a frontier. Land was free for the taking; property rights
of Indians were ignored. If a settler used up the productivity of his land he packed up
and moved to the next frontier, settling the country in the process. Land was in plentiful
supply and man gave no considerations to the effects of his land use upon his neighbors.
Unfortunately, modern man still thinks of land as a "limitless commodity -not as a finite
biological community." CouNcIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 166
(1970) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY]. Property owners still think in terms
of maximizing their return from their land with little regard for the over-all needs of
society. However, society is becoming increasingly aware of the fact that we are all in
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Seventy years ago the uncontrolled growth of our cities and the resulting
urban sprawl resulted in the enactment of comprehensive zoning plans. The
Supreme Court upheld their constitutionality in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
97
Realty Co.:
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but, with
the great increase and concentration of population, problems have developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and will continue
to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupations
of private lands in urban communities. Regulations, the wisdom, necessity, and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so
apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or
even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary
and oppressive.
As a result of rapidly growing suburbs and megalopli, regional and state
zoning is now comparable to municipal zoning as it was seventy years ago.9s
Since San Francisco Bay was too big for any city or county to control, a
regional commission was established to oversee its future development.99 The
San Francisco Bay experience will become the rule and not the exception.100
The population spread does not respect artificial boundaries of towns, cities,
counties, or states. Zoning, once restricted to cities and later extended to rural
areas, 101 must now exist on regional or state levels. Some land must be zoned
for residential use, some agricultural, some industrial, and some reserved as
open space.
The critical factor in Euclid was the comprehensiveness of the zoning
plan. 10 2 The advantage of a comprehensive plan is obvious. It provides a
purview for over-all development instead of a piecemeal approach that
results in an inadequate consideration of over-all needs. 10 3 This is especially
true when there is a need for regional planning, as with San Francisco Bay,
and that encompasses more than one political body, since the local agencies
have no incentive to plan for the entire region. State courts have also enthis world together. Land use controls have continued to grow, and indeed must continue
to grow at an increasing pace as our growing interdependence is recognized. These attitudes
constitute the foundation of the arguments pro and con on the regulation issue.
97. 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
98. Every year expanding urban areas consume 420,000 acres of land in their unplanned outward push. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 96, at 171.
99. See notes 239-278 infra and accompanying text.
100. For example, Nevada and California have established a bi-state agency to control
further development of Lake Tahoe. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§67-40-50 (West 1968); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§438.270-.410 (1968). For a general discussion of the problem of Lake Tahoe see Ayer,
Water Quality Control at Lake Tahoe: Dissertation on Grasshopper Soup, 1 ECOLOGy L.Q.
3 (1971).
101. See Wertheimer, Constitutionality of Rural Zoning, 26 CALIF. L. REV. 175 (1938).
102. 272 U.S. at 394-95.
103. For example, the issuance of a permit for construction of an apartment house in
a previously all-residential neighborhood will serve as a precedent for the issuance of future
permits, even though the discussion on the first permit does not serve as a focus for an
over-all plan for that area.
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dorsed comprehensive zoning plans, 0 4 which, in at least one case, resulted in
an almost total diminution in value. 0 5 Similarly, the comprehensiveness of
a regional plan should prove a strong point in any balancing test. The San
Francisco Bay plan illustrates the value of this approach. The Bay was
studied for its value for land development, navigation, port facilities, recreational and industrial development, pollution control, and other uses. 00 The result was an over-all plan to regulate the future development of the Bay. Land
development is not barred, but will be restricted in accordance with the
master plan. The constitutionality of this approach has been given impetus
by a recent appellate court decision.107
A kindred problem is the weight that should be given to aesthetic considerations. Past cases have mainly been concerned with billboards 08 but
auto wrecking and junk yards are receiving increasing attention in the
courts.1 09 The early rule was that aesthetic considerations would not sustain a
regulatory measure." 0 As billboards came into increasing disrepute the courts
began to sustain bans against them on public health and safety grounds,"'
ignoring the aesthetic grounds, which were of course the real reasons for the
bans." 2 The general rule today is that while aesthetic considerations by
themselves will not sustain a measure," s they will be considered in determining
104. West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881 (1937); Miller
v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925); Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams
Bldg. Corp., 229 N.Y. 313, 128 N.E. 209 (1920); In re Opinion of the Justices, 235 Mass. 597,
127 N.E. 525 (1920).. See generally Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68

HARv. L. REv. 1154 (1955).
105. See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342,
20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962).
106. A total of twenty-five such studies were made. SAN FRANcisco BAY CONSERVATION AND
DEVELoPMENT COMM'N, SAN

FRANcISco

BAY PLAN SUPPLIMIENT (1969).

107. Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 11
Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1st Dist. 1970).
108. For a historical study of the law in billboard cases see Mee, Validity of Municipal
Regulation of Outdoor Advertising, 4 JonN MARSHALL L.Q. 323 (1939).
109. Mayer v. Board of Adjustment, 56 N.J. 296, 152 A.2d 860 (1959); State v. Brown,
250 N.C. 54, 108 S.E.2d 74 (1959); Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 25, 400 P.2d 255 (1965);
Lend v. Seattle, 63 Wash. 2d 664, 388 P.2d 926 (1964).
110. See, e.g., Mid-State Advertising Corp. v. Bond, 274 N.Y. 82, 8 N.E. 286 (1937).
111. Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); In re Wilshire, 103 F. 620
(S.D. Cal. 1900); St. Louis Gunning Advertisement Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W.
929 (1911). These considerations include the danger of a sign falling or catching on fire,
its use as a privy and a dumping ground, the possibility of a sign serving as a concealment for fugitives from justice or participants in immoral acts, and the obstruction of
light, sunshine, and air, Id. at 145, 137 S.W. at 942.
112. Searles, Aesthetics in the Law, N.Y. ST. B.J. 210, 213 (1969). '"Where courts have
allowed community officials to prohibit what are in reality aesthetically objectionable land
uses, their language indicates that they have closed their eyes to the real underlying facts.
Yet what courts say and what courts do are two different things, and it is not proper to
conclude from their language that courts do not know what is going on." Dukeminier,
Zoning for Aesthetic Considerations: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 218, 223
(1955) (emphasis added).
113. Little Pep Delmonico Restaurant, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 252 N.C.
324, 113
S.E,2d 422 (1960); State v. Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 108 SXE.2d 74 (1959).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1972

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1972], Art. 1

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXV

its constitutionality. 114 Some states,1115 including New York,"1 6 will sustain a
regulatory measure solely on aesthetic grounds.
The objection to aesthetic grounds is clear. Aesthetics are intangible and
personal to the viewer. Courts try to deal with certainties and measurables.
Consequently, aesthetics have had difficulty receiving judicial recognition
when balanced against economic considerations. Yet compensation is recoverable in eminent domain proceedings for aesthetic losses such as cutting
off a view."1
In the taking area, emergency situations are often given great weight.
For example, a city might have to dynamite a building to serve as a firebreak.118 When officials on the scene must act under the stress of an emergency, more leeway should be granted than if they had time available for a
careful deliberation."19 An analogous situation occurs in wartime when the

114. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309
(1930); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193
N.E. 799 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1935).
115. Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
116. Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967). "The
exercise of the police power should not extend to every artistic conformity or nonconformity. Rather, what is involved are those esthetic considerations which bear intrinsically
on the economic, social and cultural patterns of a community or district. Advertising signs
and billboards, if misplaced, often are egregious examples of ugliness, distraction, and
deterioration. They are just as much subject to to reasonable controls, including prohibitions, as enterprises which emit offensive noises, odors or debris. The eye is entitled
to as much recognition as the other senses .
I..."
Id. at 272, 225 N.E.2d at 755, 279 N.Y.S.2d
at 30. For an early eloquent view that aesthetics should be protected see Chandler, The
Attitude of the Law Toward Beauty, 8 A.BA.J. 470 (1922).
117. Dennison v. State, 48 Misc. 2d 778, 265 N.Y.S.2d 671 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Ohio Pub.
Serv. Co. v. Dehring, 34 Ohio App. 532, 174 N.E. 448 (1929). For example, in San Francisco
a bay view adds at least 8-10% to the value of a house, office, or apartment building.
SAN

FRANcIsco BAY

CONSTRUCTION AND

DEVELOPMENT

COMM'N,

APPEARANCE

AND

DESIGN

1

(1967).
118. Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 70 (1853); Russell v. New York, 2 Denio 461 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1845). To stop the devastating fire that followed the 1960 earthquake in San
Francisco an area one block wide for the length of Van Ness Avenue was dynamited.
119. The latest Supreme Court decision in the taking area involved an emergency.
YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1965). During the 1964 riots in the Panama Canal Zone
rioters had occupied three buildings and caused some damage to them. Troops then drove
the rioters out and positioned themselves outside the buildings. However, sniper fire
forced the soldiers into the buildings, which were damaged further by molotov cocktails
tossed at the troops inside. Some buildings not occupied by the troops were also damaged or
destroyed. The owners sued for damages alleging that the government occupation constituted a taking. The Court held for the Government based on the fact that the troops were
primarily acting in defense of the buildings. All possible steps were taken to save the
buildings. An analogy was made to traditional crime and fire fighting activities, which
sometimes require destruction of part of a building. Id. at 92. In such cases where the
private owners are the intended beneficiaries of the governmental activity, fairness and
justice do not require that the general public provide compensation for their losses. Id. In
a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Harlan stated that in a riot situation compensation is
necessary only when the military had reason to believe its action would place the property
in greater peril than if no protection were afforded. Id. at 94-95.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss1/1

16

Binder: Taking Versus Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal in Light of Re
1972]

REGIONAL PLANNING AND WETLANDS

Supreme Court defers to the legislative and judicial branches. 120 This deference is undoubtedly due to a desire not to hinder the war effort. As expressed
in United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co.:121
In the context of war, we have been reluctant to find that degree of
regulation which, without saying so, requires compensation to be paid
for resulting loss of income . . . . The reasons are plain. War, particularly in modern times, demands the strict regulation of nearly all
resources. It makes demands that would otherwise be insufferable. But
wartime economic restrictions, temporary in character, are insignificant
when compared to the widespread uncompensated loss of life and
freedom of action which war traditionally demands.
There are a number of other factors that if present should be considered
in our balancing test, but are generally of lesser importance. If restrictions
are being imposed because of problems created by the regulated,122 such as
water pollution, then the state should be justified in imposing stricter regulations than if the owner is a "passive bystander," such as the owner of lands
that the state seeks to use as flood plains. In addition, the economic impact
of the proposed regulation must be considered. Since many restrictions,
especially those imposed on an industry-wide basis, may have economic consequences for the community (through employment and taxation), these fac123
tors are frequently relevant.
The complexities of the balancing test are not new to the courts. Similar
problems are frequently handled by "balancing equities" when an injunction
is sought12 4 Courts will usually balance the inconvenience to the plaintiff
from denial of an injunction against the hardship that issuance of the injunction would impose on the defendant. In searching for a reasonable alternative to an outright ban courts often consider such factors as health, safety,

120. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958); United States
v. Caltex, Inc., 844 U.S. 149 (1952). See also Korematsu v. United States, 823 U.S. 214 (1944);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 US. 81 (1943).
121. 857 U.S. 155, 168 (1958). The judicial deference in wartime is ironic because the
original intent of the due process clause was to prevent arbitrary actions by the military,
such as the seizure of supplies or funds during wartime. Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 YAtz L.J. 36, at 56-57 (1964).
122. One problem that arises in determining who has created the evil involves the
common case of the factory built years ago in an isolated area. Its pollution did not affect
anyone. But who is really responsible now that the masses surround the factory and its
discharges render the river unusable to inhabitants of the lower riparian land. In nuisance
law this problem is known as "coming to the nuisance" and courts have reached differing
results. See Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights,

1967 DuKE L.J. 1126, 1137.
For the purposes of this article the "creation of evils approach" will refer to the party
that has rendered a natural resource, such as air and water, unusable to subsequent parties.
123. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
124. See, e.g., Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper Sc Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 831, 83
S.W. 658 (1904). However, a few states will not balance the equities because to do so
would be to protect the party with the largest property interest. Hulbert v. California
Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911),
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and aesthetics.225 When the desired relief is the abatement of a nuisance the
factors that must be considered are the same as those in the proposed test. 12
Indeed, the zoning laws had their origins in the law of nuisance, 27 and courts
have made reference to nuisance law in determining the constitutionality of
many regulatory measures. 28
The application of a balancing test is not new to the courts for it has been
lurking in the background from the beginning. Decisions would be better
reasoned, however, if courts would admit that they have been applying a
rough balancing test all along and dispense with the smoke screen of conflicting rules and tests that have been erected in the past.
THE WETLANDS STORY

The first problem in discussing wetlands is definitional. The term "wetlands" is all inclusive, covering a disparate number and variety of lands. A
practical definition would include "lowlands covered with shallow and sometimes temporary or intermittent waters." 129 However, wetlands also include
tidal marshes, estuarine zones, swamps, bogs, prairie potholes, lagoons, sloughs,
lakes, and ponds. Specific wetlands include San Francisco Bay, the Everglades,
the Great Swamp of New Jersey, and the prairie potholes of the Cocteau de
Missouri in North Dakota. One eighth of wetlands are coastal while seveneighths are inland. 30
Importance of Wetlands
Wetlands are commonly viewed as wastelands useful only for mosquito
breeding. Under this approach reclamation would apparently be the only
proper use for wetlands. However, wetlands are among our most valuable
natural resources. Their value includes fish and game production, flood control, nature laboratory, open space, climate control, and air and water pollution control facilities.
Wetlands are frequently located in flood plains 3' or on the upper reaches
of rivers. One of their great attributes is that they act as a giant sponge,
absorbing vast quantities of water."32 Since water seeks its own level severe
damage may result from flooding unless the water is stored either artificially

125. Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W. Va. 608, 91 S.E. 368 (1937).
See generally W. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY §25 (2d ed. 1956);
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §§9-91 (3d ed. 1964).
127. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926).
128. Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Commonwealth v. Tewksbury,
52 Mass. (11 Met.) 55 (1846); State v. Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 108 S.E.2d 74 (1959); Kane v.
Kreiter, 250 Ohio 2d 295, 195 N.E.2d 829 (Ct. C.P. 1963); West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of
Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881 (1937).
129. S. SHAW & C. FREIDINE, WETLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1956).
130. M. CLAWSON, R. HELD & C. STODDARD, LAND FOR THE FUTURE 433 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as M. CLAWSON].
131. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 96, at 172.
132. W. WHYTE, LAST LANDSCAPE 40-42 (1968).
126.
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by dams and reservoirs or naturally through wetlands. Like dams and reservoirs wetlands release their stored waters slowly rather than all at once.
Every year government spends larger amounts on flood control projects,
and every year flood losses mount. 133 The reasons for this paradox are two3
fold. First, man is attracted to floodplains to build factories and homes;
the flatness of the land makes it highly desirable to developers. 3 5 Second, the
result of building on these lands and uprivers is the destruction of wetlands,
such as lakes and marshes. Thus, nature's way of controlling floods is eliminated. For example, drainage of wetlands was one of the causes of the peak
Minnesota floods in 1965.136
Coastal wetlands perform a similar function in preventing tidal floods and
blunting the force of tides and waves. 37 Coastal wetlands, which can store
300,000 gallons of water per acre, are even more effective as storage basins
than their inland counterparts. 38 Artificial breakwaters, such as stones, can
be ripped to shreds by forceful waves but the estuarine zone serves as a natural
buffer. Its infrastructure (the complex intermeshing of peat, bog, and heavy
grasses) absorbs the blows of waves 3 9 and the damage done to the marsh is
readily repaired by nature. Unfortunately, man cannot say the same as to
his property that is destroyed.140 The buffering effect of the estuarine zone
also greatly diminishes the amount of soil erosion from waterfront lands,
since the sea cannot enter through the marsh to tear these lands away.' 4 '
T

133. Between 1936 and 1962 Congress allocated over $7 billion for flood control. Current
expenditures exceed $500 million a year. But annual flood losses approach $1 billion a
year. Hines, Howe & Montgomery, Suggestions for Model Flood Plain Zoning Ordinance, 5
LAND & WAER L. REv. 821, 322 (1970).
134. Id. at 322-23. It is estimated that for every $6 spent by the federal government for
flood control, $5 are spent by the general public moving onto the flood plains. Id.
135. M. DOUGAL, FLOOD PLAIN MANAGEMENT - IOWA'S EXPERIENcE 4 (1969). By building
on the plains the amount of destruction caused by subsequent floods obviously will increase.
The new structures will also cause an increased water runoff. For example, an average
rooftop of 1200 square feet will shed 750 gallons of water in a one-inch rainfall. A subdivision full of rooftops might become a veritable flood-producing mechanism. W. WHYTE,
supra note 132, at 40.
136. Mann, Wetlands -Liquid Assets, 29 CONSERVATION VOLUNTEER 30, 36 (1966).
137. J. TEAL & M. TEAL, Lsrx AND DEATH OF THE SALT MARSH 214-17 (1917) [hereinafter
cited as LE AND DEATh]. Cf. Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 355 Mass. 328, 244
N.E.2d 577 (1969).
188.

P. JOHNSON, WErLANDS PRESERVATION 1

(1969).

189. Id. Breaking waves have been known to move solid breakwaters weighing over
1,000 tons, destroy small islands, and throw rocks 200 feet into the air. LIFE AND DEATH,
supra note 137, at 215.
140. A salt marsh will repair itself if let alone by man: a building cannot.
141. Cf. Rudloe, Northwest Florida: A Last Frontier, 6 UNDERWATER NAT RALiST 8, 15
(1970). In an early decision the Massachusetts supreme court upheld the validity of an
ordinance prohibiting removal of sand and gravel from a beach, even with respect to the
owner of the beach in question. The court recognized the need to protect the harbor by
preserving its beaches and the natural embankments of sand and gravel that border it. The
court pointed to the experience with Plymouth Beach where old- beach washed away
because of the cutting of wood on it or by some "other cause.' Both the state and federal
governments had to take expensive measures to restore the-original conditions and thereby
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In addition to serving as sponges for flood control, the inland marshes are
extremely important in maintaining groundwater levels in areas where soil
142
moisture frequently makes the difference between abundance and scarcity.
The fate of the Klamath Lakes region illustrates this situation perfectly. The
heart of the region was 80,000 acre Lower Klamath Lake, supported by flood
waters of the Klamath River. Drained for agricultural use in the 1920's the
lake completely dried up within four years. However, instead of becoming a
lush, fertile plain like the San Joaquin Valley in California, it became a vast
alkaline desert beset by peat fires. Even preexisting farms were rendered useless for livestock production due to the general lowering of the water table.
Realizing its mistake, the federal government added the land to its refuge
system, but the damage was done; this land will never be the same again. 143
Whether regarded as wastelands or not, the productivity of wetlands is
phenomenal. Coastal marshlands have an annual production of ten tons of
1
plant stuff per acre - six times the worldwide average for wheat production. 4
One type of marsh plant, cord grass, has seven times the food value of an
equivalent acreage of wheat. 14 5 However, with the exception of salt hay,
which is extensively harvested along the Atlantic Seaboard, none of this
plant production is directly utilized by man.
On the other hand this production is directly in the food chain of fish and
game, which are economically important to man. A secondary effect of mixing
sea water with estuaries is that large accumulated quantities of nutrients,
carbohydrates, and vitamins are washed out from the marshes to sea where
they form a vital link in the food chain of fish.' 46 Studies have shown that
larvae production of marine life and oysters increase after storms. 147 Estuaries
have been referred to as the greatest single natural resource of the United
4
States and their importance cannot be underestimated.'
Fishing forms the economic mainstay of many coastal communities.'"9

prevent destruction of navigation. Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. ( llMet.) 55, 58
(1846).
142.

U.S.

BUREAU

OF

SPORT

FISHERIES

AND

WILDLIFE,

WATERFOWL

PRODUCTION

AREAS:

(1966).
143. Foster, The Wetland Story, 43 MASS. AUDOBON 12, 13-14 (1958).
144. J. CLARu, FISH AND MAN: CONFLICT IN THE ATLANTIC ESTUARIES 3 (1967).
145. SAN FRANcISCO BAY CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMM'N, MARSHIES AND
FLATS OF SAN FRANCISCO BAY 5 (1966) [hereinafter cited as BCDC No. I].
MINNESOTA

146.

8

MUD-

Rudloe, supra note 141, at 8.

147. Id. at 14-15.
148. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 11, 1967, at 45.
149. J. CLARK, supra note 144, at 1. Half a million people make a living from commercial fishing. U.S. DEI"T OF THE INTERIOR, CONSERVATION Y.B. No. 3, THE THnR
WAVE
61 (1967). The commercial fisheries of Chesapeake Bay for Virginia and Maryland were
worth more than $29.5 million in 1964. Hearings on H.R. 26 Before the Subcomm. on
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 258 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Conservation Hearings]. Perhaps the
most famous fishing port of all is Gloucester, Mass. where 70% of its population depends
directly on fishing for a livelihood. W. JEROME, JR., A. CHESMORE & C. ANDERSON, JR., A
STUDY

OF

THE

MARINF

RESOURCES

OF THE

ANNISQUAM

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss1/1

RIVER-GLOUCESTER

HARBOR

COASTAL

20

Binder: Taking Versus Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal in Light of Re

1972]

REGIONAL PLANNING AND WETLANDS

Although the deep sea is pictured as teeming with fish, most of the ocean
is empty. 150 Two out of three species of Atlantic fish depend in some way
upon tidal lands and water for their survival. 151 Seventy per cent of our most
valuable Atlantic fish 52 and twenty per cent of our Pacific fisheries 53 are
directly dependent upon the estuarine zone for their survival. Ninety per cent
54
of the salt water fish caught by man are taken in shallow coastal waters,
while eighty to ninety per cent of the world's fishing comes from coastal
waters.'5 5 The young of the fluke, bluefish, menhaden, and king whiting live in
the estuaries although spawning in the open sea. Weakfish, redfish, mullet, and
black drum spawn in the estuarine zone. Striped bass, alewives, salmon,
sturgeon, steelhead trout, and shad depend upon fresh water to reproduce,
passing through coastal wetlands after maturing in the open sea. Some fish,
such as clams, oysters, lobsters, and sea trout spend all their lives in the
estuarine zone.' 56 Of the twelve most valuable fish only tuna, haddock, yellowtail flounder, and ocean perch do not spend time in the estuarine system, but
of these only tuna is a deep water fish'157 Commercial fishing brought $438
million to United States fishermen in 1967 for more than 4 billion pounds of
fish and shellfish.158 About two-thirds of this was recovered from estuarine dependent species. The over-all value to the economy is much greater because of
the multiplier effect as the fish move from fisherman through the distributive
chain to the final consumer.
In terms of sport fishing the monetary value of our fisheries is even greater.
Salt water anglers spent $800 million in 1965.1 9 In 1960 sport fishing was
worth $346 million on the Atlantic coast alone."60 Some of the most important
sports fishing grounds, especially in the South, are in shallow coastal wetlands
areas. The Florida Development Commission estimates that thirty-one per
cent of the state's tourist trade, which is the state's largest industry, is derived
from fishing.' 6' The effect of the destruction of wetlands on the harvesting of
SYS=ms 16 (1969). During 1966 the estimated minimum revenue for Gloucester from marine
resources was $446,222 of which $258,256 came from commercial fishing and the rest from
sport fishing. Id. at 59.
150. The ocean can be compared to a desert with occasional oases. J. CLARK, note 144
supra.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 5.
LIFE AND DEATH, supra note 137, at 207.
J. CLARK, note 144 supra.
LIE AND DEATH, supra note 137, at 207.
J. CLARK, supra note 144, at 5-10; US. DEP'T or TH

SEcRETARY

OF THE INTERIOR TO THE UNITED

STATES CONGRESS:

INTERIoR, REPORT Or THE

THE

NATIONAL

ESIUARINE

POLLUTION STUDY 17 (1970) [hereinafter cited as POLLUTION STUDY].
157. LFE AND DEATH, supra note 137, at 307.

158. POLLUTION STUDY, supra note 156, at 21. This figure is down from 4.5 billion tons
in 1964. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTEROR, CONSERVATION Y.B. No. 2, THE POPULATION CHALLENGE
33 (1966).
159. POLLUTION STUDY, supra note 156, at 152.
160. J. CLARK, supra note 144, at 25.
161. Id. at 71. As of 1967 tourism was worth $4 billion a year to Florida. Conservation
Hearings,supra note 149, at 244.
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fish and shellfish has been documented. '1 - For example, Lake Worth, Florida,
historically a large fish producer, is now almost devoid of useful fish because
of the destruction of estuaries by dredging and filling.163 Connecticut, which
has lost two-thirds of its wetlands since 1900, now produces but $2 million of
shellfish a year versus $48 million in the early 1900's.164
The nation's wetlands are also critically important in the production and
survival of fowl, such as ducks. The prairie potholes region of the Dakotas and
Minnesota produces 5 million ducks a year, which is two-thirds of all
ducklings produced in the United States. In the past this area produced threefourths of the United States production, or 15 million out of 20 million.165
It is estimated that 1 million ducks and 500,000 geese winter in the Chesapeake Bay marshes every year. 166 Up to seventy per cent of the shorebirds of
the Pacific Flyway between Canada and Mexico depend on the mudflats of
San Francisco Bay for their survival.1 67 The flats near Palo Alto are home
for over 1 million shore birds during winter. The Louisiana marshes provide
much of the winter resting and feeding grounds for North American ducks,
geese, and other fowl. 1 68 Aside from aesthetic and scientific values, ducks are
economically valuable for hunting. Hunters bring in substantial revenue to
the communities in the pothole country'6 9 and in the Mississippi and Illinois

162. Significant habitat loss has been reported for clams, oysters, scallops, mussels,
shrimp, lobsters, crabs, trout, steelhead, salmon, seatrout, mullet, striped bass, flounder,
blue fish, shad, mangrove snapper, menhaden, red fish, smelt, alewives, pollack, tautog,
croaker, and drumfish. Id. at 31. Between 1936 and 1939 San Francisco ranked as the
most important commercial fishing port in the United States. Today it ranks below the top
ten. Although it is impossible to determine the exact causes and their interrelationship,
the extensive destruction of the habitat in the Bay has played a large part. Id. at 66. Prior
to 1900, 10 to 15 million pounds of oysters were harvested every year in the Bay, and
prior to 1935, 100,000 to 300,000 pounds of soft shell clams were harvested yearly. Both
resources are completely gone today. Id. at 223. Shrimp fishing of the popular bay shrimp
has declined to 10,000 pounds a year from 6.5 million pounds.
163. J. C.ARK, supra note 144, at 11.
164. P. JOHNSON, supra note 138, at 8. In Maryland the oyster industry has declined
from a yearly harvest of 71.9 million pounds in 1880 to 30.8 million in 1920 and 8 million
in 1962-1964. Conservation Hearings, supra note 149, at 257.
165. S. SHAW & C. FRIDINE, supra note 129, at 27; U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR CONSERVATION

Y.B. No. 6,

RIVER OF

LIFE 68 (1970). These wetlands are not limited in natural values

just for waterfowl production. For example, Minnesota's wetlands are especially high in
fertility and support many other forms of animal and plant life. U.S. BUREAu oF
FISHRIES AND WILDLIFE, supra note 142, at 1.

SPORT

166. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1970, at 22, col. 5.
167. BCDC No. I, supra note 145, at 4.
168. M. CLAWSON, supra note 130, at 435.
169. Id. It has been estimated that a typical waterfowl production area in Minnesota
could easily return $1,000 a year to the local economy from money spent by users of the
wetlands, such as duck hunters. U.S.

BUREAU

OF SPORT FISHERIES AND WILDLIFE,

supra note

142, at 7. In Minnesota 40,000 hunters paid $60,000 to local farmers to hunt near Horicon
Marsh and over $50,000 of goods and services were sold by local merchants to those who
came solely for recreation. U.S. DEP'T

OF THE INTERIOR,

CONSERVATION

Y.B. No. 1,

QUESr

FOR QUALITY 56 (1965). Duck Hunters spend over $87 million a year for items such as food,
lodging, travel, and equipment. U.S.

BUREAU OF SPORT FISHERIES AND WILDLIFE,
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river bottom lands.' 0
Wetlands are also critical to the production of other goods. Certain fur
bearing animals, including mink, muskrat, racoon, and otters, live in wetlands1 Louisiana had fur sales of more.than $4.5 million in the 1965-1966
season.17 2 The wooded swamplands in the north and southwest are some of the
best white-tail deer and turkey ranges in the country. 7 3 Wild rice is an important crop from lakes and marshes in Minnesota and Wisconsin. Cranberry
174
culture is important in Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Wisconsin.
Wetlands are important in other respects. They serve as open space areas
for the public. With our metropolitan communities and their suburbs growing at a fast pace, more and more people are seeking open space in which to
just walk, think, and muse. The hectic, everyday pace of city life demands a
healthy respite.17 With the growing spread of our asphalt jungles, linked by
sterile, concrete freeways it is essential to maintain areas of nature for public
use and enjoyment. Wetlands also have educational values, not only for
biologists but also for children (and schools) who like to study and explore
nature.176 Recreational uses of wetlands include more than just hunting,
fishing, and musing. They include power boating, water skiing, hiking, bird
watching, yachting, and picknicking. 77

142, at 7.
170. M. CLAwsoN, supra note 130, at 435.
171. Fur bearers are an important source of supplemental income to many. US. BUREAU
(1967).
172. POLLUTION STUDY, supra note 156, at 150. The total sales were $6 million according

OF SPORT FISHIES AND WILDLIFE, YouR STAKE IN THE WETLANDS 6

to this study. However, this figure conflicts with an earlier figure of $50 million 73 years
earlier. S. SHAW & C. FREIDINE, supra note 129, at 40. There is no reason to believe that

fur sales have decreased in the interim. Perhaps the explanation lies in the fact that the
earlier study included all wetlands whereas the newer one includes only estuarine zones.
173. U.S. BUREAU OF SPORT FIsHEIs AND WILDLrE, supra note 142, at 6. Pheasants often
use weedy marsh edges for roosting and winter cover. Geese can often be found on the
edges of alder swamps. Id. at 5. Game and fur bearing animals that inhabit the wetlands
include gallinule, grouse, partridge, mourning doves, pheasant, quail, rail, rabbit, snowshoe
hare, snipe, squirrel, wild turkey, woodcock, antelope, deer, elk, moose, bever, bobcat, fox,
muskrat, nutria, oppossum, otter, raccoon, skunk, weasel, and alligator. S. SHAw & C. FR.aiNa,
supra note 129, at 42.
174. M. CLAwsoN, supra note 130, at 435.
175. Over 7 out of every 10 Americans live in cities today. U.S. DEP'T oF THE INRERIOR,
supra note 158, at 43. Yet recreation resources are far from adequate. Many natural resources are blighted, polluted, or dosed for public use. U.S. Dm'T OF THE INTERIOR, supra
note 165, at 70.
176. When schoolgirls in Connecticut found that the wetlands they had been using
nearby for nature studies were being filled, they launched a campaign that ultimately resulted in passage of the state's wetlands preservation act. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1969, at 69, col.
1.
177. There are 57 million fishermen in the United States, 100 million swimmers, 30
million pleasure walkers, and 114 million picnickers. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTEuOR, supra note
165, at 70. Perhaps because of their small numbers and early morning jaunts, bird watchers
were once the subject of much derision. Yet their numbers are not nearly as small as
people might believe. For example, a University of Wisconsin study showed that 80,000
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An increasingly recognized value of wetlands is its ability to counteract
air and water pollution. Carbon monoxide, most commonly found in auto178
mobile exhausts, is converted by many marsh plants to carbon dioxide,
which in turn can be converted into oxygen through photosynthesis. Carbon
monoxide is now recognized as contributing to excessive mortality rates, es79
pecially in smog plagued cities such as Los Angeles.
Filling an estuarine system like San Francisco BayB 0 can further accentuate
air pollution problems. Land gives off large amounts of heat at night, which
in turn is absorbed by the carbon dioxide, smoke and dust particles (smog)
hovering over land areas. Since the best transfer occurs at night the air
close to the ground cools as the ground cools. The air remains close to the
ground rather than circulating and dispersing the pollution particles in the
8
air.1 '
The waters of the Bay are also very important in controlling the region's
climate. Water, unlike land, absorbs heat throughout its entire mass, 8 2 and
also dissipates heat more rapidly through evaporation. The temperature
difference between land and water is responsible for air movements between
them, such as the cooling sea breeze that sweeps in over land. It is estimated
that a further twenty-five per cent filling of San Francisco Bay would result
in an average temperature rise of five degrees during the summer. 8 3
Filling also seriously hampers the fight against water pollution. Pollutants
dumped into streams and rivers usually end up in the estuarine zone. Most
pollutants in the water can be disposed of through oxidation. 8 4 They will

persons traveled an aggregate of 2.7 million miles to view the geese at Horicon Marsh in
Wisconsin. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 142, at 55. An over-all look at the
recreational opportunities of one estuarine system might be in order here. Every year in
San Francisco Bay 185,000 man-days are spent hunting, more than 3 million are spent
fishing, and 370,000 are spent picture taking and bird watching. SAN FRANcIsco BAY CONSFRVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMM'N, FISH AND WILDLIFE IN SAN FRANcIsco BAY 1 (1967).
178. BCDC No. I note 145 supra.
179. N.Y. Times, April 17, 1971, at 14, col. 1. The unsafe concentrations of the gas has
been linked to heart attacks, and have the same effect on normal reactions as being placed
at a high altitude, low oxygen level. San Francisco Examiner, March 23, 1970, at 1, col.
6 and at 20, col. 1.
180. Much attention will be devoted to San Francisco Bay because it is the most
extensively studied estuarine system in the country. The conditions discussed throughout
are not unique to the Bay but are probably characteristic of most estuarine systems, such
as Chesapeake Bay or Puget Sound.
181. Comment, San Francisco Bay: Regional Regulation for its Protection and Development, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 728, 732 (1967).
182. Almost all the radiant energy of the sun will be absorbed by the top tenth of an
inch of soil, whereas in pure water the sun will penetrate to a depth of 300 feet. SAN
FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMM'N, SMOG AND WEATHER 2 (1967).
183. Id. at 10-11. SAN FRANcIscO BAY CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMM'N, SAN
FRANcIscO BAY PLAN 10 (1969) [hereinafter cited as BCDC No. 4]. P. JOHNSON, WETLANDS
PRESERVATION at 3 (1969). The tidal marshes and their surrounding waters mitigate air
temperature extremes creating a more comfortable and temperate climate. Id.
184. SAN FRANcIScO BAY CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMI'N, POLLUTION 2 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as BCDC No. 5]
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either be oxidized in the streams or bay where dumped or flushed out to the
ocean and disposed of there. 8 5 For such oxidation to occur there must, of

course, be sufficient oxygen in the water.1 6 The mud flats of San Francisco
Bay through mud algae, exposed to abundant light and water, produce and
expel oxygen into the air and water.8 7 Destruction of these mudflats would
lessen the ability of the Bay to oxidize pollutants' 8 8 In an area like the Bay
both its surface area and total volume play an important role in determining
the ability to assimilate wastes. 18 9
With the natural importance of wetlands discussed, it is time to see what
man is doing, or undoing as the case may be.'90 The pressures on our wetlands,
especially the coastal wetlands, are tremendous. 91 Thirty-three per cent of
the population is concentrated on the coasts, encompassing only fifteen per
cent of the nation's land area 92 while thirty-five percent of the population
lives within 150 miles of the East Coast. 9 3 The coastal population growth has
greatly exceeded the general population growth 94 and competition for the
land in this zone is fierce. Industry and residential developers compete to fill
wetlands, 9 5 but form a strong alliance against any groups trying to preserve
97
them. 96 For instance, wetlands are an ideal source of land for airports
but recreational uses, including swimming, hunting, fishing, and pleasure
boating, can be just as devastating to the natural inhabitants of wetlands.
Wetlands are also tempting areas for dumps and garbage disposals by indi185. Id. at 2-3.
186. When there is insufficient oxygen for both marine life and pollution control,
the result is euthropication. The body of water will begin to die, or more precisely, marine
life will become extinct. This process has happened to Lake Erie and is beginning to
occur in Lake Michigan.
187. BCDC No. 1, supra note 145, at 4.
188. See also P. JoHNsoN, supra note 183, at 2.
189. BCDC No. 5, supra note 184, at 8.
190. It is not unfair to say: "[MEverything [man] has done along the coastline has
damaged estuarine areas." U.S. DEP'T OF Tm INTERIOR, supra note 149, at 61.

191. Industry, residential development, and mergine megalopi have profoundly altered
these estuaries. Id.
192. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 96, at 175.
193. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1970, at 22, col. 7.
194. While the population in general grew 46% between 1930 and 1960, the coastal popu-

lation grew 78%.

ENVIRONMENTAL QuALITY,

supra note 96, at 176. Estuarine zone popula-

tion is expected to double to 139 million in 2020 from 60 million in 1960. POLLUnoN STUDY,
supra note 165, at 196. Three of the four large megalopi predicted for this country lie
along the estuarine zone: the Atlantic Seaboard, the Florida Peninsula, and California. Id.
195. ENVIRONMENTAL QuALrrY, supra note 96, at 176.

196. Wetlands in metropolitan areas are among the most valuable real estate in the
world. Porro, Invisible Boundary -Private and Sovereign Marshland Interests, in 3 ABA
NATURAL REsouRc s LA.W SEcTION 512, 513 (1970).
197. Major airports built on what were once wetlands include Dulles International,
Boston, San Francisco, and Oakland. In addition to these airports plans were announced,
but subsequently abandoned under public pressure, to build airports in New Jersey's Great
Swamp. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR CONSERVATION Y.B. No. 5, IT'S YOUR WoRLA, THE
GRASSROOTS CONSERVATION STORY 25 (1969); N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1967, §6 (Magazine) at 33;
the Big Cypress Swamp of Florida, which would have destroyed the Everglades.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1972

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1972], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. XXV

viduals and municipalities. 198 A large amount of the nation's water pollution,
including toxic chemicals discharged by industry, flows into the estuarine
zone. 199 Oil spills, which show no sign of abating, -00 frequently pollute estuarine systems. Water pollution is in fact one of the most crucial problems
2 1
faced by wetlands. 0
The destruction of wetlands is well known, but the actual decrease in
acreage is not commonly known, since there are no accurate records concerning
wetlands acreage at the time of colonization. A commonly accepted figure is
2
20
127 million acres, ' of which 52 million have already been destroyed. 03

Ten million acres have been drained in Minnesota alone. 20 4 Between
1959 and 1966 an average of 138,000 acres per year were drained in the
three pothole states. 2 0 More than 1 million of these acres have been drained
since 1943.206 One-fourth of the potholes have disappeared since 1944. 207 in
the 100 years before 1955 wetlands were reduced by forty-five per cent. 20
Northern Iowa, which once abounded with wetlands, has few left2 9 and is no
longer important as a duck producing state. 2 0

By 1938 Iowa, Missouri,

Wisconsin, Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan had only ten per cent of
21
their wetlands remaining.
198. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1970, at 22, col. 4. Indeed, one of the major reasons for the
demise of New York's wetlands is filling by the Department of Sanitation. N.Y. Times, July
25, 1970, at 15, col. 1. New York City dumps 24,000 tons of waste every day into nearby
wetlands, which were once the home of large numbers of animals and birds. The wetlands
are presently inhabited only by gulls and rats. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 165,
at 22.
199. Over 15 million fish were killed by pollution in 1968. Id. at 69.
200. In 1969 there were 1,007 oil spills of over 100 barrels each in United States' waters
compared to 714 spills in 1968. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 96, at 38. Over I
million tons of oil seem to be routinely entering the ocean every year. AMmErAN LrrroRA.
SocTY, 202 QUESTIONS FOR THE ENDANGERED COASTAL ZONE 21 (1970). For a legal discussion
of the problems of oil spills see Note, Liability for Oil Pollution Cleanup and the Water
Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 973 (1970).
201. For a full discussion of the pollution problem see POLLUTION STUDY, supra note
156, at 242-82.
202. For a full discussion of this problem see S. SHAW & C. FREIDINE, WETLANDS OF TIE
UNITED STATES 6-7 (1956).
203. Presentation of P. Aus, What Is Happening to the Wetlands?, 34th North American
Wildlife and Natural Resources Conference, Washington, D.C. March 2-5, 1969, at 2 [hereinafter cited as Aus].
204. Id. at 3.
205. Id. at 4.
206. U.S. BUREAU OF SPORT FISHERIFS AND WILDLIFE, THE WATERFOWL PRODUcTION AREA
PROGRAM

4 (1964).

207. P. JOHNSON, supra note 183, at 10. In all, over half the nesting range of ducks in
the prairie pothole region has been destroyed. The two big drainage programs were after
the Civil War and following World War If when there was an impetus for record crop
production. U.S. BUREAU OF SPORT FISHE4RIES AND WILDLIFE, supra note 206, at 8.
208. U.S. BUREAU OF SPORT FIsHERIEs AND WILDLIFE, supra note 171, at 10.
209. Iowa has only 50,000 acres left out of an original 6 million acres of tall grass
prairie potholes. Aus, supra note 203, at 3.
210. M. CLAWSON, supra note 130, at 436.
211. P. JOHNSON, note 183 supra.
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Most tragic of all are the statistics reflecting the fate of the coastal wetlands, which were relatively few in number to begin with. It is claimed that of
the 14,481 square miles (more than 8 million acres) of estuarine salt marshes
212
Only about
fifty per cent have been destroyed in the past two centuries.
are left
habitat
wildlife
and
marsh
5.5 million acres of important estuarine
3
of
miles
square
300
the
of
in the United States.21 Over seventy-five per cent
only
gone;
are
1850
in
Bay
salt marshes originally surrounding San Francisco
seventy-five square miles remain. 214 The Bay itself has shrunk from 680 square
miles to 400.215 The Bay is especially vulnerable to filling, since two-thirds of
216
its area is less than eighteen feet deep at low tide. At one time the Bay went
up to Montgomery Street in San Francisco, one-half mile from the present
shoreline. 217 Without the creation of the Bay Conservation and Development
Commission in 1965 to oversee its future development, uncontrolled filling
could have reduced the Bay to 187 square miles.
Between 1955 and 1964 eight per cent or 45,000 acres of the coastal wetlands from Maine to Delaware were eliminated.2 1 8 Eight per cent a decade may
not seem like much but eight per cent of the present acreage every decade
for a century would yield a catastrophic result. In addition, although the new
effect of the loss of any given wetlands may be unimportant, the cumulative
effect is ecologically devastating. With fewer acres available, fish and game
must concentrate on an ever smaller habitat. This concentration directly
leads to higher natural mortality for the game and lower hunting opportuni-

212. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1970, at 22, col. 7.
213. POLLUTION STUDY, supra note 156, at 36. On the other hand, only 1% of Georgia's
400,000 acres of wetlands have been destroyed. Abbott, Some Legal Problems Involved in
Saving Georgia's Marshlands, 7 GA. ST. B.J. 27 (1970).
214.

SAN

FRANCISCO

BAY

CONSERVATION

AND

DEVELOPMENT

COMM'N,

1970

ANNUAL

3 (1971) [hereinafter cited as BCDC No. 6]. Indeed, California lost 294,000 acres or
67% of its coastal wetlands in the past 20 years, primarily because of the loss of 192,000
acres in San Francisco Bay. Conservation Hearings,supra note 168, at 31.
215. BCDC No. 4, supra note 183, at 2.
216. Id.
217. And North Beach was once a beach. Boston has grown even bigger. The original
area of the Boston peninsula was 470 acres, including 70 acres of salt marsh. Boston now
encompasses 3,240 acres of which 2,055 were once wetlands. LIFE AND DEATH, supra note
137, at 241. A once wild and desolute marsh in the Public Garden is now occupied by a
statue of Washington on a horse. Fresh Pond, Cambridge, was a noted waterfowl resort
at the turn of the 19th century. Sportsmen used to walk the railroad tracks from Boston
for a day's outing on the Dorchester marshes. Foster, The Wetlands Story, 43 MAsS. AuDOBON
12 (1958).
218. J. CLARK, FISH AND MAN: CoNFLICT IN THE ATLANTIC ESTUARIES 12, 21 (1967).
Connecticut had 27,000 acres of marshes in 1900. It is now down to 9,000. Conservation
Hearings, supra note 149, at 388. On the South Shore of Long Island there were 30,000 acres
of wetlands in 1936, but 16,000 in 1967. Id. at 78. Long Island lost 30% of its wetlands, or
12,635 acres, between 1954 and 1964. It then had 30,580 acres left. P. JOHNSON note 183
supra. During this period Queens lost 60% of its wetlands. N.Y. Times,. July 25, 1970, at
15, col. 1. During the course of its history Massachusetts lost 20% of its tidal marshes. Only
about 4,200 acres remain. New Jersey dropped from 296,000 acres in 1895 to 232,000 in
1964. LIE AND DEATH, supra note 137, at 248.
REPoRT
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ties for the general public.219 Although conclusive evidence does not exist,
some marine scientists believe the reduction in fish catches in recent years is
22
due to the decrease in salt marsh acreage coupled with pollution effects.
Reduction in acreage also reduced the ability of these bodies of water to
handle the problems of air and water pollution at a time when pollution is
2 1
mounting.
The greatest source of deliberate modification of the estuarine zone is
through dredging, either for navigation purposes or as part of a dredge and
fill operation.222 Dredging permits are often sought for "navigation" purposes
when the actual intent is to obtain fill for development purposes. 22 Dredging
can be injurious to wetlands in many ways. It frequently destroys the land
dredged for as use as marsh, since the channel is now too deep to support the
plant life of marches. Marsh plants can tolerate only a limited depth of water.
The depositing of dredged materials has two effects. First, the new layer
of dirt will smother the living organisms under it. This result is intentional
if the filling is done for a development project, but frequently this effect
occurs because the soil dredged for navigation purposes is dumped into an2 24
other part of the estuary without regard for the ecological consequences.
Second, the turbidity of the dumping disrupts the ecological balance in the
22
estuary for a long period. 5
Drainage projects are the biggest destroyer of inland wetlands.2 26 Mosquito
control projects have also been extremely injurious to wetlands.2 27 Mosquito
control projects have received much criticism because of the alternative
methods available for controlling mosquitoes that do not have adverse

219.

U.S.

BUREAU OF SPORT

WATERFOWL MANAGEMENT

PLAN

FISHEIES AND

WILDLIFE,

OUTLINE

OF THE CENTRAL

FLYWAY

21-22 (1958).

220. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1970, at 22, cols. 7-8.
221. See notes 180-191 supra and accompanying text.
222. From Maine to Delaware 45,000 acres of wetlands were destroyed between the
years of 1954 and 1964; 34% were lost to despoilation areas for dredge spoils; 27% for
housing project fills; 15% for recreational development; 15% for bridges, roads, parking lots,
and airports; 7% for industry; 6% for garbage and trash dumps; and 1% miscellaneous.
J. CLARK, supra note 218, at 2.
223. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 11, 1967, at 42; see, e.g., Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 394 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965). Some of these navigation
channels are big enough for the liner Queen Mary.
224. Perhaps the most tragic aspect of drainage and dredge and fill operations is the
irreversible effect. It is, however, possible for wetlands to recover from euthropication, oil
spills, thermal pollution, pesticides, and pollution in general.
225. The effect is similar to stirring the bottom of a large fish tank. See Rudloe,
Northwest Florida: A Last Frontier, 6 UNDERWATER NATURALIsr 8, 11-15 (1970).
226. In 39 states 131 million acres have been drained for agricultural purposes and
34.8 million more acres can be drained for cultivation in the eastern United States. Aus,
supra note 203, at 3-4. Farmers drain their lands for two reasons (1) to secure additional
cropland, (2) to accommodate larger farm machinery. Id. at 5.
227. Some of the most valuable species of fish are the most sensitive to pesticides; these
include shrimp, oysters, and dams. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERUOR, CONSERVATION Y.B. No. 3,
THE THIRD WAVE 64 (1967).
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ecological consequences. 22s Whether by drainage 229 or by the use of toxic
chemicals such as DDT230 the resulting effect has been the elimination of
wetlands.
Although it might be expected that the states would not act to destroy
231
this astheir wetlands in light of present knowledge of their importance,
sumption sometimes proves false. In 1967 and 1968 New Jersey sold 176
acres in Assassawoman Bay, the state's most productive marsh, for 17,600
dollars. The tract was then dredged, filled, subdivided, and then resold for
3,500 to 5,000 dollars per lot. Another 190.6 acres were traded for 562 acres
elsewhere. 2 3 2 Between 1955 and 1970 New Jersey sold 30,000 acres or ten per
cent of the state's total. 233 Virginia is presently involved in litigation involving
a purported sale of 36.5 acres on the Potomac. 234 Hopefully, transfers like

228. The cutting of channels, either for mosquitoe control or navigation, will disrupt
the intricate balance between wet and dry areas, fresh and salt waters. U.S. BUREAU OF
SPORT FISIERIES AND WLDLIFE, YOUR STAKE IN WEr LANDs 10 (1967).
229. Small quantities of pesticides, such as DDT, have killed crab and shrimp larvae,
oysters, and fish. They have decimated osprey populations. Most importantly, they are
deadly to plankton, among which are the plankton that photosynthesize. AMmuCAN LrrroRAL
Socmrxy, supranote 200, at 22.
230. See J. CLARK, supra note 218, at 14. For example, ditching if properly planned, will
not decrease basic salt marsh productivity. AME.IcAN LrrroRAL Socyzry, supra note 200, at
23.
231. In the past when wetlands were regarded as wastelands, wholesale land disposal
by governments of their wetlands was widespread. Under three Swamp Acts the federal
government patented almost 65 million acres of wetlands to the states. Almost all of this
land is in private hands today. S. SHAW & C. FREMINE, supra note 202, at 5. This report
contains an interesting description of how a typical state, Iowa, disposed of its wetlands:
"In this state the land was turned over to the counties. It was bartered for all sorts of
considerations, such as public buildings, bridges and like purposes foreign to the intent
of the acts granting the land. Some counties went beyond this and bargained with immigration companies, selling the land to a company for 25 to 75 cents an acre, with the provision that the company put settlers on the land. In other cases, the land was sold by the
county commissioners to themselves for nominal considerations. Other counties gave their
wetlands to railroad companies." Id. For a description of the sordid facts involving the
disposition of lands in San Francisco Bay see SAN FRANCIsCo BAY CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMN'N, OWNrSanm 23-25 (1968); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource
Law: Effective judicial Intervention, 68 MicH. L. REV. 471, 490 n.62, 525 n.162 (1970). Considering the dubious circumstances under which many of these lands were acquired from
the Government, it is somewhat surprising that the owners will try to preclude the imposition of restrictions against them on the ground that said restrictions constitute a taking.
However, if he present owners are bona fide purchasers for value without notice then, under
an early case, the state cannot assert the title deficiencies against them. Fletcher v. Peck,
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). But see Sax supra at 527 n. 174.
232. N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1970, at 30, col. 1.
233. N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1969, at 37, col. 1. In many cases like these there will be
either conflicts of interest or political favors under the surface. See Sax supra note 231, at
475.
234. Fairfax County Fed'n of Citizens Ass'ns, Inc. v. Hunting Towers Operating Co.,
Civ. Act 4963-A (E.D. Va. 1969). The litigation is based upon a violation by the state of
the public trust doctrine. See Sax note 231 supra. For a full story of the times and events
of this transfer see J. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION 3-51
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these will become less common.2 35

The Legal Status
The Legislative Response. With the increasing awareness of the value of
wetlands, legislation is being enacted to preserve these natural resources 36
Perhaps the first "wetlands preservation" measure was enacted by Florida in
1957. The act requires studies to be made of the effect on fish resources by the
establishment of bulkhead lines for fill purposes; the lines denote the point
to which filling is allowed.23 7 Responsibility is delegated to the local communities, but the state retains final authority. It should be noted though that
with the exception of a few grants made by the King of Spain before 1821,
the tidal lands are still owned by the state. The bulkhead lines therefore really
denote which lands will be sold by the state.238 Consequently, the taking
versus regulation problem is generally non-existent in Florida as to wetlands.
Dredge and fill statutes are the most common form of legislative enactment
for the protection of wetlands. Under these statutes the owner must obtain
a permit from a designated governmental body before dredging or filling,
or both, his wetlands. Recent variations require obtaining a permit before any
change or modification can be made. The purpose of these statutes is to preserve the ecological values of wetlands to the greatest possible extent. The
appropriate governmental bodies are charged with considering the importance
of wetlands before exercising their discretion in issuing, modifying, or denying a permit application.
Massachusetts' law 239 requires a permit from the board of selectmen or the

city licensing authority, the state department of public works and the director
of marine fisheries. A public hearing with notice is required on the local level.
The director of marine fisheries may impose such conditions in the permits
as he deems necessary to protect the fisheries.
In New Hampshire a permit must be obtained from the New Hampshire
Water Resources Board. 240 If the project affects shellfish or marine fisheries
the director of marine fisheries can impose conditions.241 The Water Resources

(1970).
235. For a discussion of similar scandals involving Florida see Conservation Hearings,
supra note 149, at 244-45.
236. For a copy of most of the measures adopted before 1968 see P. JOHNSON, WETLANDS
PREMERVATION at A-1 (app.) (1969).

237. FLA. STAT. §253.122-.123 (1971).
238. Florida has recently created a system of statewide aquatic reserves; 11 are on
the Atlantic coast and 14 on the gulf coast. No more submerged lands within these
preserves will be sold nor will any dredge and fill permits be issued for these lands. Traditional uses such as swimming, boating, fishing, navigation channels, and docks will be
allowed. Heath, Estuarine Conservation Legislation in the States, 5 LAND & WATER L. R.v.
351, 365 (1970).

239. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 130, §27A (1972).
240. N.H.. REv. STAT. ANN. §483-A (Supp. 1971).
241. Id.
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242
Board has power to deny the permit.
The permit requirements of the Maine Act were similar to those of Massa43

chusetts.

The Act also established a Wetlands Control Board.244 The Act,

however, was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine.24

5

A recently enacted Connecticut bil246 is stronger than that of Massachusetts
in that the state can require posting of a bond. 47 If conditions are not met the
permit can be revoked and the bond forfeited. Any violation of the act also
248
entitles the state to receipt of the cost of reclamation from the violator.
249
The dredge and fill statute of Rhode Island
is exceedingly weak. The
penalty for not obtaining a permit is only 500 dollars and no standards govern
issuance of permits. Indeed, it is not even clear if the permit can be denied
or reasonable conditions attached to its issuance.250

Recognizing that traditional dredge and fill statutes are inadequate to
deal with the environmental problems involved, a number of states have
enacted supplementary or new statutes based on the old style dredge and fill
laws with a new emphasis on environmental aspects.
In 1965 Massachusetts passed a "Selective Regulations" Act. 25 1 Under this
Act the commissioner of natural resources with approval of the board of
natural resources, and after public hearings, can issue orders governing the
alteration or pollution of coastal wetlands. Within ninety days after receipt of
an order the owner can contest in court. If the court determines that the order
constitutes a taking and not a regulation the department of public works
52
may acquire the property through eminent domain.2
In 1968 Massachusetts passed an "Inland Wetlands" Act.253 The commissioner, again with approval of the board, and after holding public
hearing can issue orders regulating, restricting, or prohibiting changes to

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, ch. 421, §§4701-09 (1964).
Id. §§4705, 4707.
See notes 305-307 infra and accompanying text.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §23-7 (h)- (o) (Supp. 1972).

247. Id. §22-7 (m).

248. Id. §22-7 (o).
249. R.I. GEN. LAWS

ANN.

§11-46-1-1 (Supp. 1971).

250. The operative section of the statute provides: "Be it resolved That any person who

dumps or deposits mud, dirt, or rubbish upon, or who excavates or disturbs the ecology in
intertidal salt marshes, or any part thereof, without a permit therefor issued by the department of public works shall be fined for each offense $500, one half to the use of the
state and one half thereof to the use of the complainant." Id. This act is hardly calculated
to instill the wrath of God into a would-be developer.
251. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 130, §105 (1972).
252. Id. So far, a wetlands protective area of 8,000 acres has been established on the
north shore of Massachusetts. Heath, supra note 238, at 368. It is not expected that many
owners will insist on payment. S. DEBARD, MASSACHusETTS CONSERVATION COMM'N HANDBOOK
38 (1968). The state has used this act to survey its wetlands and to assign values to them,
in effect carrying out a statewide zoning program. J. CLARK, supra note 218, at 33.

253. MAss. GEN. L ws ANN. ch. 131, §40A (1972).
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inland wetlands. The statute does not cover lands used for agriculture
and any order must be approved by the local selectment. Upon adoption of the
order a copy must be recorded. The owner has ninety days after receipt to
contest. If there is an objection the commissioner must either repeal the
order or purchase the land. Failure to object within ninety days precludes a
later contestation of the order's validity. The lands affected by the statute
2 54
encompass 300,000 acres.
In addition to its dredge and fill act Rhode Island has a "Compensatory
Regulation" Law255 under which the director of the department of conserva-

tion and agriculture may designate coastal wetlands whose use shall be restricted.2- 6 The value of coastal wetlands to the public for health, marine
fisheries, wildlife, and the protection of life and property from floods, hurricanes, and other natural disasters must be considered. If the owner of the
2 57
land suffers damage from the regulations he is entitled to compensation.
5
The owner has two years to file suit s However, the act is presently dead
letter law, since the legislature has not passed funds necessary to implete it.
Georgia has recently passed a Coastal Marshlands Protection Act creating
a Coastal Marshlands Protection Agency.2 59 A proposal to remove, fill, dredge,
or drain coastal wetlands requires a permit from the agency. The agency has
power to deny the permit if, inter alia, the proposal will "unreasonably interfere with the conservation of fish, shrimp, oysters, crabs, clams, or any marine
life or wildlife, or other natural resources, including but not limited to
water and oxygen."

26 0

The permit can be revoked for non-compliance or

violations of any conditions contained in it.
New Jersey has recently enacted the Wetlands Act of 1970.261 Under its

provisions a permit must be obtained for engaging in a regulated use on its
coastal wetlands. Regulated activities include, but are not limited to, draining; dredging; excavation; removal of soil, mud, sand, gravel, or other aggregate; dumping or depositing rubbish or liquid wastes; or building structures; driving piles; or placing obstructions in the water. The commissioner
of environmental protection can issue, deny, or modify the permit application. The statute also requires the commissioner to make an inventory and
maps of all tidal marshes in the state within two years. The maps are recorded with the land.The commissioner can also make orders regulating, prohibiting, or restricting the development of these lands. Notice must be given

254. S. DEBARD, supra note 252, at 37. Under an earlier act, MASS. Gm-N. LAWS ANN. ch.
131, §40 (1967), notice had to be filed and a public hearing held to drain, remove, dredge
or fill inland wetlands. The Departments of Natural Resources and Public Works could
impose conditions. Many dumps were closed under some of the 600 orders issued pursuant to
the Act. S. DEBARD, supra note 252.
255. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§2-1-13 to -17 (Supp. 1971).
256. Id. §2-1-15.
257. Id. §2-1-16.
258. Id. §2-1-17.
259.

GA. CODE ANN. §§45.136-.147 (Supp. 1971).

260. Id. §45.140 (a) (7) (e) (3).
261. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§13:9A-1 to -10 (Supp. 1971).
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to the owners at least twenty-one days in advance and a public hearing held
before such orders can be adopted. The owner has ninety days after notice
of the final order to sue. If he fails to act within this time period he loses
2 2
all right to attack the validity of the order.
Under a recent North Carolina statute 63 application must be made to
the state's Department of Conservation for a permit. The Department circulates the application to all state and federal agencies, which might be
affected, for their advice. A permit is issued if the Department finds it will
not be contrary to the public interest considering, inter alia, public health,
safety and welfare, conservation of the water supply, and consequences on
on wildlife and fisheries. The permit can be denied or issued with conditions
attached.
In 1970 Maryland enacted a wetlands act 264 under which the Secretary of
Natural Resources makes an inventory of all privately owned wetlands. After
giving notice to owners a public hearing is held after which the Secretary
adopts rules and regulations governing the development of wetlands. Copies
of the orders are recorded and the owners have the right of administrative
and judicial review. Upon exhausting his administrative remedies the owner
has thirty days to appeal. If it is determined that such rules and regulations
so restrict the use of property as to deprive the owner of its practical use
2 15
the taking is unconstitutional.
In order to engage in proscribed activities the owner must obtain a permit
from the Secretary. 26 6 In exercising his discretion to issue a permit the Secretary can require the posting of a bond sufficient to guarantee performance
of any conditions contained in the permit. 267 In any event the owner can use
his wetlands for conservation, trapping, fishing, hunting, shellfishing, or for
improvements on lands bordering navigable waters to preserve access to these
waters or to protect the shore against soil erosion.268
Certain observations are in order regarding these acts. First, with the
exception of Massachusetts, state legislatures have acted only to protect the
coastal wetlands; the owners of inland wetlands are free to drain or fill them
as they see fit. Second, the development of these acts demonstrates the necessity for strong laws in this area. More and more legislatures are enacting
wetlands protection acts, recognizing the value of our wetlands. The earlier
acts covered only dredging and filling. Realizing the inadequacy of these
measures later acts provided for increasingly stronger restrictions until some
statutes now preclude any development of these lands. Since the orders are
recorded in the title to the land they serve as constructive notice to any
262. Connecticut's act also has recodation and inventory provisions similar to that of
New Jersey; but the time in which to seek judicial review is only 80 days. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §22-7 (j) (Supp. 1972).
263. N.C. GEN. STAT. §113-229(e) (Supp. 1971).
264. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66c, §§718-30 (1970).

265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. §725.
Id. §720.
Id. §727.
Id. §723.
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subsequent purchaser. The owner is generally provided with ninety days to
contest the orders. 269 Failure to object within this period constitutes a waiver
of any objections. The orders undoubtedly affect the value of the land.
Three legislatures have tried to avoid the taking problem by defining
the point at which compensation is required, but such a precise measurement
results in inflexibility. If the conditions are met, compensation must either be
paid or the restrictions will be held inapplicable. The Rhode Island statute
is clearly too broad, since any regulation on property will affect its value
resulting in some "damage" to the owner. The New Jersey and Maryland
acts provide that a taking occurs when there is no practical use left for the
property. Although the statutes are quite narrow in this respect they may be
too broad under some circumstances. And even these statutes do not fully
resolve the problem for the courts must still decide what constitutes "no practical use."
Another variation of the permit system exists in the federal government.
A permit must be obtained from the Army Corps of Engineers and the Secretary of the Army to make changes affecting navigable waters, such as dredging
or filling. 270 This law gives the Corps a great amount of power to determine
the future development of our coastal wetlands, since most of them are in
navigable waters. In the past the Corps ignored ecological values and even
strong public protests27' in granting permits that would destroy wetlands.
However, there is now evidence that the Corps is beginning to consider environmental consequences, and some cases have arisen out of the Corps' re2
fusal to grant permits that would result in destruction of Florida wetlands. 72

269. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, §105, Ch. 131, §40A (1972).
270. 33 U.S.C.A. §403 (1970). The Corps in turn must consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service "with a view to the conservation of wildlife resources." 16 U.S.C. §662(a) (1970).
271. Between 1962 and 1966 the Corps issued 70 permits over objections of the Fish and
Wildlife Service, but denied only 11 pursuant to its objections. The Corps also issued 229
conditional permits that were approved by the Service. Conservation Hearings, supra note
149, at 129. A total of 27,930 permits were issued out of 28,050 applied for during this
period. Dr. Cain, Ass't Secretary of the Interior, testified that the Service had given up
asking for permit denials and instead sought modifications. Id. at 32.
272. Two cases involve denial of permits by the Corps. The taking problem does not
appear in these cases in the context we have been discussing. In Coastal Petroleum Co. v.
Secretary of the Army, 315 F. Supp. 845 (S.D. Fla. 1970), the Corps denied a permit to
extricate limestone from part of the bed of Lake Okeechobee, which is the largest body of
water wholly contained in the continental United States. It serves as a playground, wildlife preserve, navigation link between the east and west coasts of Florida, water source, and
tourist attraction. The Corps would not grant the permit unless the state authorities consented, which they did not. The district court held that the denial on ecological grounds
was unconstitutional because the Corps had no such power. However, the court allowed
the owner to recover only money damages. In exercising this "judicial power of eminent
domain" the court stated: "[T]he balancing of interests between Coastal, the Trustees, and
the people of the State of Florida lends weight to the prevention of such mining operations
by a private company." Id. at 850. The Corps and a flood control district were mining the
lake for limestone to be used in levee construction along the lake's shore. The court did
not adopt plaintiff's argument that he should be allowed to mine, since the Government was
also mining. On the contrary, the court stated the government agencies were "balancing
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In an interesting and important experiment California has established the
San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) to
control development of San Francisco Bay.273 Anyone seeking to fill or to
"make any substantial change in use of any water, land or structure" must
acquire a permit from the BCDC. 2 74 "Fill" has been defined to include
houseboats and floating docks as well as earth. The city council or board of
supervisors of the local community must file a report with the BCDC in
ninety days if they must also give approval to the project under local law.
The BCDC subsequently holds a public hearing. The requirements governing
issuance of a permit require the project to be for the public health, safety or
welfare, or be consistent with the San Francisco Bay Plan then in effect. Under
the plan previously drawn up by the commission, and a statute subsequently
enacted to implement the plan, the project must be for a water related use
with no upland location available and only the minimum area necessary
276
can be used.275 In 1970 the BCDC issued twelve permits and denied one.
Although BCDC is essentially a variation of the traditional dredge
and fill statute it has two important innovations. First, it is regional

public interests with public interests. Coastal's scale would balance the public interest
with profit. In dealing with the Lake [we] do not find Coastal's balance acceptable." Id.
The holding that the Corps lacked the power to deny a permit on ecological grounds
was reversed in Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970). The Corps had denied a
permit to dredge and fill on navigable waters of Boca Ciega Bay in Florida. State and
federal agencies had opposed the permit because of the distinctly harmful effect the
project would have on the fish and wildlife of the Bay. Perhaps surprisingly, considering
its past record, the Corps heeded their objections and refused to grant the permit. The
district engineer of the Corps recommended denial of the permit even though the "proposed work would have no material adverse effect on navigation." Id. at 202. The Fifth Circuit approved the Corps' decision. In what promises to be an epic decision the court held
that the: "Secretary must weigh the effect a dredge and fill project will have on conservation before he issues a permit." Id. at 211. The court held the destruction of fish and
wildlife in our estuarine systems has an effect on interstate commerce, and accordingly comes
within the congressional control over navigable waters pursuant to the commerce clause.
The denial of a permit cannot be a taking, since, as discussed earlier (see notes 55-57
supra and accompanying text) the federal government has the "paramount servitude"
in navigable waters. 430 F.2d at 215. Property rights in these waters are not enforcible
against the federal government. Unfortunately, the simplicity of this approach is not
available to the states, which must grapple with the taking versus reasonable regulation
problem.
Perhaps as a judicial rebuke to prior court decisions involving wetlands, the court stated
in Zabel: "In this time of awakening to the reality that we cannot continue to despoil our
environment and yet exist, the nation knows, if courts do not, that the destruction of fish
and wildlife in our estuarine waters does have a substantial, and in some areas a devastating,
effect on interstate commerce." Id. at 203-04.
273. The commission was established on a temporary basis in 1965. CAL. Gov'T CoDE
§66,620 (West Supp. 1972). In 1969 it became a permanent agency. CAL. GovT CODE
§§66,601-61 (West Supp. 1972).
274. Id. §66,632 (t).
275. Id. §66,605.
276. BCDC No. 6, supra note 214, at 7. The fact that only one application for a permit
was denied does not mean permits are easily obtained. The effect of the act has been to
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in scope, covering an entire ecosystem irrespective of political boundaries
Second and most importantly, the basic scheme of the statute envisages a
master plan similar to those traditionally used by urban planning commissions.277 As noted earlier the existence of a master plan was crucial in
gaining judicial acceptance of urban planning schemes, and such plans will
surely help to make regulation of rural land areas more acceptable to the
278
judiciary.
The BCDC did not actually draw up a "master" zoning plan, but it did
inventory the bay and prepare maps showing the value of individual parts
of the bay for such purposes as wildlife habitat, shell deposits, water related
industries, port facilities, airports, waterfront parks and beaches, tidal marshes,
ship channels, vista points, freeways, supertanker terminals, marinas, and
other water related uses. Consequently, any permit to develop lands under
the jurisdiction of the commission is considered on the basis of how it will
facilitate the purposes of the Bay Plan. In reality a master zoning plan has
been established.
THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE

Before analyzing the few wetlands cases decided so far it will be helpful
to consider first the flood plains cases, since they are the progenitors of the
wetlands cases and frequently

involve similar issues.27 9 Indeed, many of

the flood plains cases involve wetlands. Two cases have upheld the constitutionality of flood plains zoning.
In Vartelas v. Water Resources Commission2 80 the Supreme Court of Errors
of Connecticut upheld a statute requiring a permit from the Water Resources
Commission to build a structure or encroachment that would interfere with
the navagability of a channel. The legislation was enacted as a result of the
disastrous floods of 1955, and the court was strongly influenced by this fact.
The case involved an attempt by the owner to rebuild a bridge that was
destroyed by the floods. In upholding the Act the court stated:28 1
The loss of human life and the destruction of property wrought by
the floods in August, 1955, justified the legislature in conferring upon
the commission broad powers to adopt preventative measures against
their repetition.
The court was influenced by the difference between structures in existence,
which would be removed by eminent domain, and structures yet to be built,

compel would-be fillers to consider thoroughly their plans before coming to the commission
for approval. Indiscriminate fill projects that had imperiled the Bay in the past are not
even submitted to the commission, since the developers realize the certainty of denial.
277. CAL Gov'T CODE §66,603 (West Supp. 1972).
278. See notes 97-107 supra and accompanying text.
279. For an early article dealing with flood plains regulation see Dunham, Flood Control
via the Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1098 (1959).
280. 146 Conn. 650, 153 A.2d 822 (1959).
281. Id. at 657. 153 A.2d at 825.
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like the bridge in the present case. It felt that this was a natural distinction
for the legislature to make. The court noted, however, that the case did not
involve the Commission's denial of a permit to build a structure such as a
pier, which would not impair the channel's capacity during a flood. Furthermore, the case did not involve the extent to which the state could restrict
28
land use; a question that would be of crucial importance in a later decision. 2
An Iowa court also upheld the constitutionality of flood plains zoning in
a case where the owner started building without obtaining the requisite
permit.28 3 The court used many of the available theories in upholding the
act, including balancing, the presumption of constitutionality and the burden
of proof, and the relation of the ends to the means. Unfortunately, it is not
clear what theory formed the basis of the court's decision. However, one persuasive factor was undoubtedly the court's recognition of the need to control
2 114
floods:
[A] river uncontrolled may at flood state become a devil, a destroyer
of life and property, a disrupter of transportation and commerce vital
to the state and its citizens ....
[W]ater and its control are obviously
of paramount importance to the welfare of the people.
As with Vartelas the court was concerned with the constitutionality of the
act, and not the extent of the power.
When courts have addressed themselves to the extent of the state's power
they have generally decided in favor of the landowner. In Hager v. Louisville
& Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Commission2sa the Kentucky Court
of Appeals struck down a proposed zoning ordinance creating "ponding
areas" in unincorporated territories in connection with a flood control project.
Although these ponding areas were needed as temporary storage basins the
court held the proposed zoning would constitute such a limitation on the use
of the property as to amount to a taking for public use. The court was
especially concerned by the public nature of the Act, feeling that the Commission was trying to use private property to accomplish a public purpose: 28 6
The Commission may not under the guise of amending its master
plan... transfer rights in private property to the city and the county
which the latter may only acquire by purchase or by the exercise of
the power of eminent domain .... [The result is also an appropriation
of private property for public use without just compensation ....
In 1963 the New Jersey supreme court in Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills287 invalidated a township
zoning ordinance covering Troy Meadows, a 1500 acre swamp. Certain uses
282. Dooley v. Town Planning &cZoning Comm'n, 15 Conn. 804, 197 A.2d 770 (1964).
283. Iowa Natural Resources Council v. Van Zee, 261 Iowa 1487, 158 N.W.2d 111 (1968).

284. Id. at 1297, 158 N.W.2d at 118.
285. 261 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. 1953).
286. Id. at 620.
287. 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
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were permitted under the ordinance,28 8 but the court found that, with the
possible exception of raising fish and aquatic plants, they were impractical.
Seventy-five per cent of Troy Meadows was owned by Wildlife Preserves, Inc.,
a conservation organization that did not, of course, object to the proposed
ordinance. The ostensible purpose of the ordinance was flood control. The
court recognized the value of the meadows for flood control, but was equally
impressed with the public purpose behind the act - serving as a water deten28- 9
tion basin and preservation of open space:
[I]t will be noted that many of the... permitted uses... are public
or quasi-public in nature, rather than of the type available to the
ordinary private landowner as a reasonable means of obtaining a return
from his property ....
It is equally obvious from the proofs, and legally of the highest significance, that the main purpose of enacting regulations with the practical effect of retaining the meadows in their natural state was for a
public benefit.
In 1964 the Connecticut court, which in Vartelas had upheld the constitutionality of flood plains zoning, invalidated an attempted rezoning from
residential to flood plains in Dooley v. Town Plan and Zoning Commission of
0
Of the 404 acres in the zone private owners possessed
the Town of Fairfield.29
180, the town owned 206, and the federal government had 28. The result of
the ordinance would be a diminuition in value of seventy-five percent for
the property. The use of the land was restricted to parks and playgrounds. In
invalidating the ordinance the court followed the diminution in value test,
29
but also felt: 1
Where most of the value ot a person's property has to be sacrificed
so that community welfare may be served, and the owner does not
directly benefit from the evil avoided . . . the occasion is ripe for the
use of eminent domain.
A fact that may have strongly influenced the court was that the town had
levied an 11,000 dollar sewer assessment against the property. The effect of
the zoning plan would be to make the sewer line worthless to the plaintiff.
In this respect the town was particularly greedy, since the plan made the
land practically worthless to the plaintiff, but the town continued to assess
high taxes on the land. Such action practically demands a decision in favor
of the landowner.

288. The permitted uses included: raising of woody or herbaceous plants, fish and fish
food, outdoor recreational uses operated by a government agency; conservation area;
hunting and fishing reserves; transmission lines and substations; antenna towers; sewage
treatment plants; and water supply facilities.
289. 40 N.J. at 592, 193 A.2d at 240.
290. 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964).
291, Id. at 312, 197 A.2d at 774.
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Finally, in Hofkin v. Whitemarsh292 a Pennsylvania trial court also followed the diminution in value test in invalidating the creation of a flood
plains zone. The land had previously been zoned AA residential. Plaintiff
sought a variance to build three 6-story apartment houses on 17.9 acres. He
had previously developed the remainder of the 175 acre tract. Certain uses
were permitted, 293 but the court found them "impractical and completely
profitless"294 and "fantastic";295 the only practical uses were as a park and wildlife sanctuary. Here too the court realized the importance of flood control,
but felt that in this case the problem could be solved by piping a small stream
across the tract to a properly designed culvert.
In focusing upon wetlands the most famous case for examination is Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co.2 96 Massachusetts brought
suit under its dredge and fill statute to enjoin further filling of Broad Marsh
by defendant in violation of conditions contained in its permit. The permit
allowed dredging, but not filling. Although the defendant alleged the dredging
was for a channel and future construction of a marina the trial court found
that the real purpose was to obtain fill on which houses would be built.
Since no taking was found an injunction was granted. The court was im29 7
pressed by the importance of the marsh for fish and shellfish production.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the basic constitutionality of the Act, stating: "Mhe Legislature dearly has power to protect and
preserve the fish and game of the Commonwealth." 29 As to the particular
application of the act, however, the court adopted a test based on the
deprivation of practical use (or total ban) citing with approval both Morris
County and Dooley. The mere fact that a public purpose was involved would
not justify every conservation measure because "in this conflict between the
ecological and the constitutional, it is plain that neither is to be consumed by
the other."299 Defendant claimed, as might be expected, that if he could not
fill the land it was worthless. The case was remanded to determine if in fact
there was a reasonable alternative use open to defendant if he were not allowed to fill. On remand the state dropped the case when it was assigned to
a "tough" judge30 ° Thus, although the deprivation of practical use test
will control future cases in Massachusetts, it is still uncertain what will constitute a practical use. Must it be something of the magnitude of a housing
project, or can it be the nurturing of an oyster bed?

292. 42 Pa. D. &C.2d 417 (1967).
293. The permitted uses included cultivation and harvesting of wild crops, game farms,
fish hatcheries, wildlife sanctuaries, sewage treatment plants, and utility transmission lines.
294. 42 Pa. D. & C.2d at 420 (agricultural and kindred uses).
295. Id. (hunting and fishing uses).
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

344 Mass. 104, 206 N.E2d 666 (1965).
Id. at 106-07, 206 N.E.2d at 669.
Id. at 107, 206 N.E2d at 669.
Id. at 111, 206 N.E.2d at 671. This language creates echoes of a balancing test.
Heath, Estuarine Conservation Legislation in the States, 5 LAND & WATER L. REV.

351, 361 (1970).
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The result of Volpe has been followed in two other cases. In MacGibbon v.
Board of Appeals3", the town of Duxbury denied a permit to plaintiff to
excavate and fill 10,000 square feet of a seven-acre tract. Under the guise of
zoning the board of permit appeals intended to preserve its coastal wetlands
02
in their natural condition by refusing to grant special permits (variances).3
The Massachusetts court held that this purpose exceeded the zoning powers
of the town under the Zoning Enabling Act and did not feel compelled to
adjudicate conclusively the issue of taking, since the case was being remanded
304
to the board.303 However, it stated:
If the town intends and desires to preserve its remaining undeveloped coastal or inland wetlands in their natural, unspoiled condition
for the enjoyment and benefit of the public, there are ways by which
it may lawfully accomplish the purpose. It may acquire the wetlands
or easements therein by gift, by purchase, or by taking by eminent
domain ....
The implication is clear that the Massachusetts court does not approve of
wetlands preservation through zoning or prohibitions on development. Consequently, it appears to be the rule in Massachusetts that if the state wishes
to preserve wetlands in their natural state it will have to do so by acquisition,
and not by regulation.
In State of Maine v. Johnson3°5 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
invalidated an order by which the Wetlands Control Board denied a permit
to fill a 260 by 220 foot plot on a salt marsh. Fill was deposited anyway, and
the state sought an injunction. The lower court granted it, but the supreme
judicial court reversed. The trial court found that unfilled the land had no
commercial value. 30 6 The supreme judicial court spent a considerable amount
of time groping for a proper theory, but found the Massachusetts cases to
be of "particular significance." The court was undoubtedly impressed by
the totality of the ban against development. The critical paragraph of the
opinion is:307
As distinguished from conventional zoning for town protection,
the area of Wetlands representing a "valuable natural resource of the
state" of which appellants' holdings are but a minute part, is of
state-wide concern. The benefits from its preservation extend beyond
town limits and are state-wide. The cost of its preservation should be
publicly borne. To leave appellants with commercially valueless land
in upholding the restrictions presently imposed, is to charge them with
more than their just share of the cost of this state-wide conservation

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970).
Id. at 640, 255 N.E.2d at 351.
Id. at 641, 255 N.E.2d at 352.

Id.
265 A.2d 711 (1970).
265 A.2d at 716 (1970).
265 A.2d at 716 (1970).
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[T]heir comprogram, granting fully its commendable purpose ....
pensation by sharing in the benefits which this restriction is intended
to secure is so disproportionate to their deprivation of reasonable use
that such exercise of the State's police power is unreasonable.
A very recent Connecticut supreme court case has followed Dooley in invalidating a local wetlands preservation measure. 08 In order to preserve its
wetlands, the town of Old Lyme enacted a zoning measure restricting the use
of tidal marshiands to public boat landings and public ditches. Application
for special exception could be made to the Old Lyme Zoning Commission.
Plaintiff had purchased four acres of wetlands in 1961 for a nominal consideration for investment purposes. Zoned for commercial purposes the land was
worth 32,000 dollars but under the wetlands restrictions it was only worth
1,000 dollars. The ultimate question was whether the zoning laws were so
unreasonable and confiscatory as to amount to a taking without just compensation. The court, citing Dooley held that under the facts the zoning laws
were unreasonable.309 The court was impressed by the fact that "plaintiffs
use of his property was practically non-existent."31 0
On the other side of the spectrum is a recent California court of appeals
decision, Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation &
Development Commission,311 which upheld the denial of a permit by the
BCDC to dredge and fill a part of San Francisco Bay. The land was acquired
in 1964 for 40,000 dollars as a site to deposit fill from construction projects.
In deciding for the state the court was impressed by the legislative determination of the need to save San Francisco Bay.3 12 The court rejected the argument
that the denial of the permit constituted a taking:31 3

In view of the necessity for controlling the filling of the bay, as expressed by the legislature . . . it is dear that the restriction imposed
does not go beyond proper regulation such that the restriction would
be preferable to the power of eminent domain rather than the police
power.
The court further distinguished both Dooley and Morris County from the
instant case. Of Dooley it said there was no other use available except for

flood control, resulting in a seventy-five per cent diminution in value. Of
Morris County it said the practical effect of the regulation was to expropriate
private property for a flood water detention basin and open space. Here,
however, "[t]he purpose of the regulations and restrictions ...is not merely
308. Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n, 161 Conn. 24, 282 A2d 907 (1971).
809. Id. at 29, 282 A.2d at 910.
310. Id.
811. 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (Ist Dist. 1970). In a recent case, Potomac
Sand & Gravel v. Mandel, 3 ERC 1723 (1972), a Maryland circuit court upheld its wetlands
legislation concerning the Potomac River, its decision was partially based upon the ecological

importance of the wetlands involved.
812. 11 Cal. App. 8d 557, at 564-65, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897, at 900-01, 905.
818. Id. at 572, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
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to provide open spaces. Rather, they are designed to preserve the existing
character of the bay while it is determined how the bay should be developed
in the future."314

These distinctions are very weak. The only reason the court could distinguish the prior cases on the grounds of no alternative use, and a seventy-five
per cent diminution in value, was because it did not address itself to the
plaintiff's argument that these restrictions deprived him of the total use of
his property. 15 The above language would seemingly indicate that these
restrictions were temporary pending the development of the San Francisco
Bay Plan.316 In fact, these restrictions were permanent, and the court must
have been aware of this fact. In 1969 the legislature changed the status
of the BCDC from a temporary to a permanent organization and accepted its
recommendations for preserving the Bay. In addition the "Save the Bay"
subject was a matter of much public discussion and public pressures on
the legislature prior to the 1969 statute.3 17 Since the court sits in San Francisco
it would be extremely difficult for it to be unaware of the permanency of the
restrictions.
The real distinction between this case and the New England decisions is
that here the court was impressed with the imperative need to preserve the
Bay, whereas in the other cases the courts were more concerned with the
burden that was being placed on the landowners, although these courts
also professed to recognize the importance of wetlands. A further distinction
may be found in the fact that in this case the regulation was part of a comprehensive regional plan for development of the entire region rather than a
piecemeal restriction as in the New England cases.
THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE WITH LAND REGULATION

The Candlestick decision may be viewed as an exception to the general
course of wetlands decisions, but on the other hand it is perfectly consistent
with the California pattern of land regulation. In Miller v. Board of Public
Works 3 s the California supreme court was one of the first courts to uphold
the constitutionality of a comprehensive zoning plan, antedating the Supreme
Court decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company.3 9

314. Id.
315. The court engaged in semantical juggling. The owner claimed to deprive him
of any practical use of the property was to invade the area of eminent domain. The court
responded that an "undue restriction" would be a taking, but such is not the case here. Id.
316. Application for the permit was denied on Jan. 20, 1969. Thus, it came under the
provisions of the old law, which was only temporary pending a full study of the Bay.
There were no provisions under this act for a permanent denial of a permit. CAL. Gov'T
CODE §66,632 (West Supp. 1972).
317. For the full story of the fight to save the Bay see Note, Saving San Francisco Bay:
A Case Study in Environmental Law, 23 STAN. L. REv. 349 (1971).
318. 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925).
319. 272 U.S. 359 (1926).
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In 1962 the court carried the doctrine of a comprehensive zoning plan
to its ultimate in ConsolidatedRock Products Co. v. the City of Los Angeles 20
by approving a zoning restriction prohibiting removal of rock and gravel from
a lot, which the trial court found would have "no appreciable economic
value" if quarrying were not allowed. 321 The quarry was in an area with
a national reputation as a haven for sufferers of respiratory ailments and
residential development was encroaching upon the quarry. The Supreme
Court of California upheld the restriction stating: "The primary purpose of
comprehensive zoning is to protect others, and the general public, from
3 22
It
uses of property which will, if permitted, prove injurious to them."
further stated that although reasonable minds could differ as to the necessity
and propriety of these restrictions, it would bow to the legislative determina3 23
tion of the need for this measure.
The attitude of the California court can also be seen in its dedication
cases. There are two forms of land dedication. The first is similar to adverse
possession.32 4 If the owner of property allows the public to trespass continuously or use his property the public right becomes an "easement" after
a period of time. The owner cannot restrict the exercise of this public right
acquired by prescription. Future development that would impair the public
right is prohibited and the owner is not entitled to compensation.
In Gion v. City of Santa Cruz325 the court held that uninterrupted public
use for five years would create a presumption of intent by the owner to dedicate the land. To overcome this presumption the owner must either
affirmatively prove he has granted the public a license to use his property or
demonstrate that he has made a bona fide attempt to prevent public use. 326
The court noted that parks and beaches could be designated by dedication
and noted the strong public policy expressed in the state constitution and
3 27
statutes encouraging public use of shoreline recreational areas:
This intensification of land use combined with the clear public
policy in favor of encouraging and expanding public access to and use
of shoreline areas leads us to the conclusion that the courts of this
state must be receptive to a finding of implied dedication of shoreline
areas as they are to a finding of implied dedication of roadways.
The other form of dedication is compulsory dedication in subdivision
cases. In many states before a developer can develop and subdivide land he
320. 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962).
321. Id. at 519, 370 P.2d at 244, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
322. Id. at 524, 370 P.2d at 348, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
323. Id. at 532, 370 P.2d at 352, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 648.
324. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970);
Thornton v. May, 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969); Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375
S.W.2d 923 (Tex.Ct. Civ. App. 1964); see Comment, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L.
Rav. 564 (1970).
325. 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970).
326. Id. at 41, 465 P.2d at 57, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
327. Id. at 43, 465 P.2d at 59, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
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must either dedicate certain parts of the tract to the local community for use
as schools, playgrounds, parks, and open space or pay a cash equivalency to
the community. Courts generally uphold these restrictions 31s but there are
two justifications for their constitutionality. First, the increased population
pressure on the community from the subdivision frequently requires an increase in public facilities, such as schools, to accommodate the population
increase. Thus, it is only fair that the source of these costs pay for them.
Second, by being allowed to plat his land and subdivide it, the owner earns
a larger return than if the land were sold in a single, unplatted block. In return for this benefit to the developer the community can compel him to dedicate land to offset the new burdens placed on it.
In a recent decision, Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay,
Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek329 the California supreme court upheld the
330
California dedication statute. In general it stated:
Undeveloped land in a community is a limited resource which is
difficult to conserve in a period of increased population pressure. The
development of a new subdivision in and of itself has the counter
productive effect of consuming a substantial supply of this precious
commodity, while at the same time increasing the need for park and
recreational land. In terms of economics, subdivisions diminish supply
and increase demand.
As to the California experience the court noted "the elimination of open
space in California is a melancholy aspect of the unprecedented population in331
crease which has characterized our state in the last few decades. "
Herein lies the crux of the willingness of the California courts to sustain
broad regulatory measures over land use. In part, these cases can be attributed
to the progressive reputation of the California judiciary,3 3 2 but primarily it is
because the California courts have been the first in the nation to face the
vast population pressures being exerted on our lands. No other state in the
country has been subject to the population pressures of California, 33 es-

328. Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 24, 394 P.2d 182 (1964);
Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 218 N.E.2d 673 (1966);
Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 38 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442, appeal denied, 385
U.S. 4 (1966); cf. Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375,
176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
329. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971).
330. Id. at 641, 484 P.2d at 613, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
331. Id. at 638, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
332. People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1969) (criminal
rights); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 433 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 979 (1962) (torts:
licensee-invitee rule); Elmore v. American Motors, 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 652 (1964) (torts: products liability).
333. Although the United States population rose from 131,669,275 in 1940 to 203,184,772
in 1970 (52.7% increase) the California population rose to 19,953,134 from 6,907,387
(186% increase) THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FAars 149 (1972). Between 1960 and
1970 California's population rose 25A% but that of the country as a whole rose only 11.7%.
Id. In an opinion just released, Friends of Mammoth v. Mono County, 4 ERC 1593 (1972),
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pecially southern California. With the rapid increase in population came an
awareness of the need to utilize more fully the land for the benefit of the
general public. The court has recognized the necessity of more restrictive
land management than previously occasioned by the helter-skelter pattern
of development, which has generally resulted in land mismanagement. If
the only way of insuring proper land management is on a regional scale,
the courts are prepared, as in Candlestick, to support this approach.
APPLICATION OF THE BALANCING TEST

The extent of restrictions against use and development is the first factor
be
considered in a balancing test. Even if the ban is not total, the range
to
of permitted uses is so limited as to result in a large diminution in value.
Unfortunately, the use restrictions necessary to save our wetlands must be
harsh ones.334 Development, as normally viewed in terms of housing units
and industry, will destroy all ecological values of wetlands. Consequently,
this form of development must be restricted, resulting in a severe drop in
property values based upon maximum use. However, under our balancing test
severity of restrictions will not per se result in a taking. If compelling reasons
arise to offset the severity, then a finding of reasonable regulation may be
in order.
The importance of wetlands is clear and is accentuated by their demise.
These lands are highly valuable for fishing and hunting,355 flood control, 38 6

the California supreme court interpreted the state's Environmental Quality Act of 1970,
to require a county board of supervisors
CAL PuB. REs. CODE §§21,000-21,151 (West _),
to prepare environmental impact statements before acting on a developer's application for
a building permit if the environmental effects of a project are significant. Thus, private as
well as public projects must consider their effect on the environment if a permit must be
obtained from a public body before construction can begin. Since permits must normally be
obtained for any construction work this ruling has broad implications for future land
planning in the state. Presumably, public officials will be less likely to approve a project in
the future if the consequences appear severe. The effect of this ruling has
been to temporarily freeze issuance of building permits in California while several large
projects have been stilled. Gottschalk, Guarding the Land: California Court Ruling on
Ecological Impact Throws Builders, Lenders, Unions for a Loss, Wall Street J., Oct. 9, 1972,
at 24, col. 1 (Midwest ed.).

334. If wetlands are to be preserved for their natural ecological values, restrictions on
their development must be severe. Wetlands constitute a complex of highly intricate interrelationships. Changes in the form of dredging or filling can, and probably will, destroy
the ecosystem. Drainage is permanent. Projects such as piers and structures erected over
the water probably will not interfere with navigation or the free flow of water; but they
will destroy the ecological value for plants and fish. Sunlight, essential for photosynthesis
and nurturing of plant life, will be cut off from the water. Although some life will
exist in these waters the marshes and waters will be dead when compared to the previous
activity.
335. See notes 146-176 supra and accompanying text.

336. See notes 132-140 supra and accompanying text.
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and pollution control. 33 - Such functions are also proper for protection by
the state.338
Government regulation of the use of wetlands to prevent inland and
tidal floods is not only for the protection of the public interest but also
for protection of the owners of these lands from their own folly.3 3 9 Persons
who buy property on flood plains or near the seashore frequently do not
realize the consequences until after nature has struck. Developers are frequently aware of the consequences but, except for the short period when
lots remain unsold, they have no risk.3 40 Once they have sold the land they
bear no further liability. Consequently, they build even though they realize
the adverse ecological consequences.
One final observation is in order concerning the owner's claim that no
practical use is left open to him. Frequently the owner only wants to use
the land for development in the form of subdivisions or industry. He often
does not consider alternative uses that may not be nearly as profitable or as
quickly realizable as filling. Yet these potential uses, such as shellfish nurturing, sea hay harvesting, duck clubs,3 4 1 fishing, or muskrat production can
3 42
be economically rewarding.
There is a certain irony in the judicial affirmance of wetlands development. Judges, politicians, and ordinary citizens are increasingly involved in
the fight against pollution in an effort to save man from his past ecological
indifference and indeed, to save man. In the cases where it is alleged no practical use is open to the property it is ironic that the only practical use is in
a sense not development, but pollution. By developing these wetlands the
direct result is often injury to the general public, the owner, and the accentu-

337. See notes 180-189 supra and accompanying text.
338. See notes 88-90 supra and accompanying text.
339. One commentator does not believe the law should protect people from their
own folly, since "freedom of choice necessarily implies that the chooser must take the
consequences of choices rationally made." He goes on to state that consequently it is
almost impossible to find a statute protecting people from their own folly. Dunham, Flood
Control via the Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1090, 1127 (1959). In fact, a large number
of our statutes are designed to protect people from their own folly. Two examples are the
drug laws, especially those applying to addictive drugs, and statutes requiring motorcycle
riders to wear helmets.
340. For example, in the Iowa flood plains developers were frequently aware of the risk
of floods, but they recognized they would face the risk for only a short period. Thereafter,
the risk transferred to the new owners. M. DOUGAL, FLOOD PLAIN MANAGEMENT: IOWA'S
EXPERIENCE 53 (1969).
341. Of the 75 square miles of salt marshes still surrounding San Francisco Bay 50 are
owned by duck clubs.
342. For example, economic yields in Maine's estuaries are worth $33,563 an acre in the
marketplace for an annual harvest of shellfish and bait worms when scientific management
practices are adhered to. Unmanaged, the return is $15,750 an acre. The best garden crops
in Maine yield but $2,000 an acre in crops. Conservation Hearings, supra note 149, at 216.
Shellfish production in Southhampton Town, Suffolk County, New York, ranged from a
net of $750 an acre to $4,000 an acre in 1966. P. JOHNSON, WETLXNDS PRESERVATION 8 (1969).
Since these resources are renewable a capitalized value at a rate of 5% will show the true
value of these lands used solely for shellfish production.
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ated desecration of the environment. Air pollution is intensified and water
pollution remains unpurified by nature. Climatic conditions deteriorate and
flood losses, in both lives and property, are increased. Coastal communities
would be periodically washed out by tides unless they invested in expensive
and extensive breakwater. systems. Food supplies, especially of fish, will
diminish, with a subsequent depression of many coastal communities. This
devastation is the practical use to which the owner seeks to utilize his property.
These considerations outweigh the commercial harm resulting from the totality of the ban, which is frequently necessary in these cases.
Although the ecological value of any single acre of wetlands is probably
not strong enough to warrant these restrictions, the cumulative effect of individual losses is devastating. "Hunt and peck" filling has been particularly
harsh on the wetlands of Florida. In addition, the granting of a permit to
develop a few acres opens the door to future development. Subsequent developers will not fully understand or accept the fact that they are not allowed
to develop wetlands when similar property was developed only a few months
or years earlier.
It appears then that the wetlands problem presents the taking-regulation
problem in its most acute form. Although the value of wetlands to the public
is paramount, the necessary restrictions may make the land almost unuseable
4
and the cost of acquisition by eminent domain is prohibitive.3 3

343. To a certain extent government is acquiring wetlands. In the pothole region the
federal government has purchased 231,330 acres and has acquired easements on 784,923
acres. The easements are perpetual and prevent drainage, filling, burning, or leveling

of wetlands. The acquisitions were initially funded by the sale of duck stamps. 16 U.S.C.
§718d(c) (1970). However, when the sale of duck stamps proved inadequate Congress in
1961 authorized a fund of $105 million for these purchases, to be repaid from future
stamp sales. U.S. BuREAu OF SPORT FIsYERIES AND WILDLIFE, WATERFOWL PRODUCrION AREAS:
MINNESOTA 11 (1966). Once again though, the revenues from duck stamps are becoming inadequate because of rising land costs. N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1969, at 30, col. 1.
New Jersey, North Carolina, California, Maine, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Delaware
have substantial land acquisition programs or plans, Heath, supra note 300, at 357. Under
a 1961 Green Acres bond issue of $60 million New Jersey acquired 13,000 acres of salt
marsh and is acquiring 10,000 more. Combined with an acquisition program of the United
States Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife it is expected that 90% of the remaining high
value coastal wetlands will be protected. Id. at 369. In New York a Long Island Wetlands
Act permits the state to share the maintenance and development costs equally with local
governmental bodies that have restricted their wetlands to conservation uses. N.Y. CONSEaV.
LAw §360(e) (McKinney 1967). But the towns must still acquire the wetlands from their
own funds. So far, 16,500 acres are covered and there are plans to extend protection to
another 16,000 acres. Heath note 370 supra.
But as a general rule the purchase programs are modest compared to the large acreage
outstanding because of budgetary restraints. The acquisition cost of all 70 million acres is
astronomical. For example, it is estimated that the value of the privately owned lands at
the bottom of San Francisco Bay is between $28.5 and $285 million. BCDC No. 4, supra
note 192, at 4. Twenty-two per cent of the Bay is in the hands of private owners. Id. at 2.
It would take at least $94 million to acquire the remaining wetlands on Long Island. P.
JOHNSON, supra note 343, at 12. The estimate is based on a minimal value of $.3,500 an
acre. However, the value of the lands is as high -as $20,000 an acre. Id. Consequently, the
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There is one practical alternative to the outright bans employed on a
broad scale in the New England cases, and that is regional planning such
as the master plan for San Francisco Bay. In this way the relative ecological
value of each unit of wetlands can be appraised and restrictions placed on it
accordingly. New Jersey's recent statute authorizing a two-year inventory of
wetlands, and the imposition of a subsequent regulatory scheme, is a perfect
method of implementing this approach. A base of regional restrictions, which
is analogous to a comprehensive zoning plan for municipalities, can help
demonstrate to a reviewing court that there is no reasonable alternative to
the restrictions placed on a lot. In addition to the restrictions it might be
desirable if the plan also set out the permissible uses for each lot. The articulation of permissible uses would help show the reviewing court the deliberation and consideration that went into the preparation of the plan. To further
help its position, and to be as fair as possible, the agency should be willing to
extend advice to the owner on how to maximize his uses and thereby to
"make the best out of a bad thing."
Regional planning is the best means of equitably distributing the burdens occasioned by wetlands preservation. No landowner will be treated
differently from another simply because he applied for a permit later than his
neighbor or his land is located in a community with stricter regulations
that its neighbors. Development will be permitted according to ecological
values and how to satisfy the over-all needs of the region. With proper land
management becoming a necessity due to the population pressures exerted on
our lands, only planning for the ecologically proper area can best achieve
rational land management. Although a diminution in value will ordinarily
result to the wetlands owners involved, this will partially be offset by a
8
corresponding decrease in property taxes. 44

acquisition cost would be much more than $94 million. With wetlands becoming ever more
desirous to developers, the cost of acquisition is continually rising.
344. Taxes are, or should be, proportionate to the property value. A restriction in
use should be reflected in the property market value. Consequently, if the uses are severely
restricted, so too should be the valuation and resulting taxes. As a historical matter, taxes
on wetlands have been low, or non-existent, perhaps reflecting their value as "wastelands."
N.Y. Times, March 16, 1969, at 13, col. 5.
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